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FAIR USE, EFFICIENCY, AND

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Gid eo n Parchomovsky*

The fair use doctrine is at once th e most significan t and the most problematic qualification of th e copyright owner's right to excl usivi ty. An affirm ative defense again st co pyri g ht liabi lity, th e fair use doctrine
legitimates ce rtain unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted materials
that would o therwise be regarded as copyright infringeme nts. Notwithstanding its importance, "fair use " co ntinu es to be "the most troublesome
[doctrine] in the whole law of copyright." 1 Throughout its long history,
neith e r courts nor legislatures h ave provide d a useful d efinition of "fair
use" nor h ave they adumbrated its objectives.~ Since the doctrine's inception over two and a half centuries ago,3 courts and legislatures have
a ttempted to formulate, explicate , refine, and revamp th e fair use doctrine . Generally, these efforts have proven unfruitful.-+ At best, they h ave
resulted in various formulations of how to approach fair use questionsS
that offer courts and users of copyrighted works scant guidance on how
fair use should be recognized. All this would not have been of grave
concern had judges shared a common understanding of fair u se or of
the principles that should guide them in deciding fair use cases. Th e
probl em is th at they do not. 6 Rath er, the case law reflects widely divergent
noti o ns of the concept of fair use. The lack of consensus is best witnessed
'] .S. D. candid a te , Yal e Law School ; LL.M. Un i\·e rsity of California at Berkeley; LL.B. Hebre w
University, Jerusa le m.
I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Avi Bell, Rich ard McHug h , and Pe ter Si ege lman for invaluabl e
contributio ns. I a m especia lly indebted to Jules Col eman for encourage m ent and insightful
comm ents.
l. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2cl 661, 662 (2cl Cir. 1939). See also Robert C.
Ellickson, ORD ER WITHOUT L-\W, H ow NEICHBORS SETT LE DISPL'TES, 258 (1991) (describing th e
fa ir use d oc trin e as "a murky area of law"); and Lloyd L ·weinre b , Fair:s Fair: A Comment on the
Fair U1e DortrinP-, 103 H -\RV. L. RE\'. 1137, 11 37- 38 (1990) [here in after: Weinreb].
2. See generally Pierre N. Leva!, Toward r1 Fair Uw· Standard, 103 H.-\R\' . L RE\'. 1105, 1105- 6
( 1990) [he rein after: Leva!].
3. SPe gPnemllv William F. Patr y, THE F.-\ IR UsE PRI \'II .E(;I·: 1'-i COPYRIGHT L-\w (2nd e el. 1995)
3-1 8 [hereinafter: Patn-].
4. !d. at 1106.
5. Set', e.g., Pau l Goldste in, COP)RICHT: PRI NU PI.ES , Lm .\1\ D PR.-\C:TIC:E , § 10.1 at l 0 : l-1 0:2
(2 nd eel. 1995) [herein afte r: Gol clste in , Copvrig ln: Principles] .
6. Leva!, sujJ m note :2 , at !lOb ('Judges do n o t sh a re a co nse nsus on th e meaning of fair use .
Earli er decision s provid e little basis for pred icting later ones").
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in th e mul tiple reversals' an d divid e d c o urts~ that h ave become the h a llm a rk of fa ir use litiga ti o n .
This unhappy state of affairs h as le d some legal sch o la rs to conclud e th at
th e doctrine of fair u se is imp ervious to g enerali zati o n s, a nd thus th a t its
m e anin g sh o uld be de rived "bv inducti o n from concrete cases. "9 Other
promin e n t sch o lars h a\'e rej ec ted this ske ptic al conclusio n , and have instead sought to explain and , wh ere possible, to justify a particular inte rpretation of the fa ir use doctrine. The th eories pro fe rre d in supp o rt of th ese
interpre tations fa ll in to two ge n e ral ca teg ories: those that expl ain fair use
in, bro adly speaking, efficiency terms I o and tho se that see fa ir use as an
el ab o ra tion of certain co mmunitari an id e als.! I Given that the do ctrine at
issu e is "fair use ," co n spicuous by its abse nc e is an explanation of the
d octrin e grounded in m o re ge n eral conside ration s of fa irne ss . I ~
The vari ous attempts to explain the do ctrine by economic e ffici e ncy and
co mmunita ria n prin cipl es ar e misguided . The most we ll-kn own and fully
d evelope d accounts are internally inconsiste nt, n early impossibl e to implem e nt in practice , a nd incapable of offering guidance to pote ntial users of

7. Six recen t pro minent cases were reversed at every stage of review. In Ro se m ont Enterpri ses, In c. v. Rand om H o use, Inc. , 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y), mv 'd 366 F.2d 303 (2cl. Cir. 1966),
cerl. denied, 385 U .S . 1009 (1967) th e Second Circuit reversed an injuncti o n issu ed by th e
di strict co urt. In Universal City Studios, Inc.\'. So ny Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp . 429 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) , rl'v'rl, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 198 1), rro 'd 464 U.S. 417 (1984) the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district co urt's findin g of fair use and then was reverse d by the Supreme Court' s
h o lding for the defendant. In Harper & Row Publishers In c. v. Na ti o n Ente rprises, 557 F. Supp.
1067 (S .D .N.Y) , modifil'(/, 72 3 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rn)d 47 1 U.S. 539 (1985) the decision of
th e di stri ct court to award damages to th e pl ain tiff was reve rsed by th e Secon d Circu it, which
in turn was reversed by th e Supreme Court. In Salinger v. Random House , Inc. ; 650 F. Su p p.
41 3 (S.D.N.Y 1986), wu'rl, 8 11 F.2cl90 (2d. Cir.) , rerl. denil'(/484 U. S. 890 (1 987) , the Second
Circuit reversed th e distri ct court' s finding of fair use . In New Era Publicati o ns Inte rn a tional
v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y 1988), a[j'rl o n oth er grounds , 873 F. 2d 5 76
(2cl. Cir. 1989) th e distri ct court's finding of fair use was reversed on appeal. Fin ally, in
Camp bell\'. Acu ff-Rose Music , In c., 754 F. Supp. 11 50 (M. D. Tenn. 199 1), wu'd 972 F.2d 1429
(6th Cir. 1992) , rn01 5 10 U.S. 569 1164 (1994) , the district cou rt's findin g of fair use was
reversed by the Sixth Circuit an cl then reve rsed again by th e Supre m e Co urt.
8. In th e first two cases that reac h ed the Supre me Court it spli t 4-4 and th us in both cases
n o opinion was issu ed . Se11 Willia ms & Wilkins Co. v. U nited States, 420 U .S. 376 (1975);
Columbia Broad castin g Sys. v. Lowe's, In c., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). The Sony case was decided by
a 5-4 maj ori ty ; sel' Sony, 464 U. S. 417; the HrnjJer & Row case was d ecid ed by a 6--3 m ajority; see
HarjJer & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
9. We inre b, sujJia note 1, at 11 38.
10. See, e. g., We ndy J. Gord o n , Fair U>e as AfarketFailure: A Structural and t-'ronomir Analysis of
t!u~ Betrwwx Case anrllts PredecPssor, 82 Cor.u~vr. L R£\'. 1600 (1 982) [hereinafter: Gordon, Fair
Use ] a nd .William F. Fi sh e r, Reconslru rlingthe Fair U1eDortrine, 101 H ARV . L. RE\'. 16:)9 (1988)
[h ere inafter: Fisher] .
11. See, r. g., Linda J. Lacey, Of Brrad and Roses and CojJyriglzls, 1989 DuKE L. .f. 1532 , 1584-93
(1989) .
12. \,\'e inrc b in hi s sh ort comment on Leva!, sujJra note 2 , does n ot advance a full-fl edge d
th eorv of fairn ess or an ythin g a kin to that. Alth o ugh h e d ee m s fairn ess pertin e nt to th e Hfa ir
use" problem h e to uts a case-by-case an alvsis and docs n o t o ffer a sp eci fi c test that can be
appli ed to fair use d e terminati o ns..'ite\•\'einre b, sujJm n ote l. It is n o tcworth\·that th e app roac h
\Ve in reb intimates a nd th e \·icw I lav o ut in thi s art icle \arv d ra m atica ll v.
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copyrighted works. In addition, these accounts fail to account for central
features of existing doctrine and rest on dubious normative foundations.
Property rights are normally understood as conferring upon their holders th e power to exclude and to alienate. Thus, property rights are often
understood in terms of control or autonomy over a resource that resid es in
th e right holder. The t~1ir use do ctrin e h as established a significant conso-aint on the power of a right holder to control one 's resources. Such
constraints typically call for a justification. In other words, the prin cipl e , if
there is one, that underli es fair use doctrine should explain why some uses
or takings are "fair" and thus do not require compensation, '"'hereas other
uses are unjustified takings requiring compensation. Existing theorizing
fails to produce the ne ed ed justificatory principle.
After making good on m y claim that prevailing accounts inadequately
explain existing fair use doctrine and fail to justify the distinctions fair use
doctrine invariably involves, I propose an alternative account that explains
central features of existing doctrine, offers practical guidance, is impl ementable in practice, and is, in addition, normatively attractive.
My claim is that "fair use" doctrin e embodies a general requirement of
fairness that is expressed by what George Fletcher refers to as the paradigm
of reciprocity of risk .l'l At the heart of this paradigm lies the principle that
liability should be affixed to persons who impose nonreciprocal risks on
others. This principle is satisfied when a person creates a risk to others that
is different in degree or kind from the risks to which this person is subject.l4
Reciprocal risks, on the other hand, do not give rise to liability because they
cancel or balance each other. To determine which risks are reciprocal and
which are not, one ought to look to the customary practices and the social
conventions that govern risks in a relevant community.
Understanding fair use as an elaboration of the principle of reciprocal
risk has two implications for how courts should understand and apply the
doctrine in particular cases. First, only creators but not copycats should b e
potential candidates for fair use. This is because copycats who slavishly
reproduce intellectual works impose a nonreciprocal risk on creators of
copyrighted works. Second, only users whose takings comport with customary practices that govern creative activities in the relevant community
should be able to avail themselves of the fair use defense.
Although these principles fall short of supporting a bright line rule, they
are clear and relatively easy to apply. 'W hile I do not claim that courts have
consistently decided fair use cases in accordance with these principles, I do
claim that a significant part of the case law is compatible with the m. More
importantly, these two principles are reconcilable with the constitutional

13 . See George F. Fletcher, Frurness
[hereinafter: Fletcher].
14. lrl. at 5cJ8.

1/1/(/

Utility i 11 "l in I Themy, 80 H ..>.R\". L Rr:v. 537 ( 1972)
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and statutory provtstons that demarcate the law of copyright, and thus
courts may apply these principles without need for any legislative action.
The article itself is divided into four parts. Part I sketches the developmen_t of the fair use doctrine ever since its emergence in the English courts
of Law and Equity to the most recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Part II describes and evaluates the prevailing efficiency and
communitarian theories of fair use. Part III, the heart of the article, explores the relation among fair use, corrective justice, and reciprocity of risk.
It also provides a rights-based analysis of the doctrine of fair use and lays out
a normative theory of how fair use cases should be decided. Part IV shows
how the paradigm of reciprocity of risk fits within the statutory framework
and applies it to some of the leading fair use cases.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE:
BETWEEN FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY

The doctrine of fair use originated in the decisions of the English Law and
Equity courts. A review of the early English cases reveals that, in its nascent
form, fair use was a relatively coherent doctrine.lS The English courts
regarded the copyright as the property of the author and treated intangible
and real property evenhandedly.l6 The focal point of the fair use inquiry
was whether the putatively infringing use of the defendant was legitimate.
In particular, the courts looked to two factors: whether the putatively infringing use involved "the fair exercise of a mental operation deserving the
character of an original work"l7 and whether the second user had taken
from the first with the intention of pirating (animo furandi) _18 It is important
to note, however, that when the allegedly infringing work failed to meet the
required standard of creativity, fair use was denied, notwithstanding the fact
that the second user had acted in good faith.l9 In addition to these two
factors-the nature of the second use and the intention of the appropriator-the English courts ascribed some importance to prevailing customs
and practices of trade.20 A fact that bears emphasis is the strict exclusion of
public utility considerations from the fair use inquiry. The fair use inquiry

15. See Patry, supra note 3, at 3.
16. See, e.g., Tonsow v. Walker 3 Swans. (App.) 672, 680 (1752); also Mawan v. Tegg 2 Russ.
(Ch.) 385,390-91 (1826).
17. Wilkins v. Aikin 17Ves. (Ch.) 422 (1810); cited in Bramwell v. Holcomb 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.)
737,738 (1836).
18. See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley 4 Esp. 168, 170-71 (1803).
19. See, e.g., Roworth v. Wilkes 1 Camp. 94 (K.B. 1807); alm Patry, supra note 3, at 11 n. 22
and the sources cited therein. As Patrv points out, the absence of aminus jinandi did not
operate as a legal defense, but its presence operated "to deprive the appropriator of the
privilege of fair use." !d.
20. Doclsley v. Kinnersley Am b. 403,405 (1761) (No. 212). ("The court must take notice of
the springs !lowing from trade; ancl though they cannot regard customs of trade as binding,
yet will consider the consequences of them").
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ce ntered on th e rights of th e co pyri g ht own er vis-:t-vis the all eged in fr inger.
The inte rest of the public at large was deem ed irr e l eva nt. ~l
Th e early Ame rican decisions foll owe d th e prin cipl es th at had bee n laid
o ut by the En g lish courts . Th e essen ce of th e fa ir u se doctrin e that evolved
in En glan d was cap tured by Justice Story in hi s landm ark opinion in Folsom
v. Nlanh.'2 ~ Jus tice Sto r y began his opinion by describing two extreme cases
of copying. At th e on e extreme he loccne d cases wh e re the e ntire substan ce
of a copyrighted work is lifted . At th e o pposite ex tre m e h e located cases of
copyin g for th e purposes of ge nuin e revi ew and criticism that do n o t
supersed e th e o rigin al wo rk. '2:i In-be tween cases we re requi re d to ex hibit a
"real, substanti al cond e nsatio n of th e materials, and intell ec tual lab o r and
judgme nt bestowe d th e reon; a nd not merely fa cile use of th e scissors."24
As William Patry points ou t, Story's o pinio n in Folsom is laudable because
it avoids the mistake of weighing th e inte res t of the autho r against th e
interest of th e publi c. Instead , it fo cuses on th e question wheth e r th e
defendant's ta king was fair.~5 It is notewo rthy th at in this case the infringing
work was an ado ption of a se ries of books on th e life and writings of
President Washington that was intend ed to ser ve sch ool libraries, and thus
the public interest strongly supported a finding of fair use .'26 Nonetheless,
this fac tor did not figure in Story's d ecision. However, public interes t and
utilitarian considerations did not remain b eyond th e ken of the fair u se
d e termination forever.
Utilitarian considera tions have infiltrated the fair use analysis re latively
recently. In 1966 in Rosemont Enters. v. Random H ouse, In c.,27 the Second
Circuit subordinated the fair use do ctrine to the constitutional foundation
of copyright law by asserting that:
The fundam e ntal justification fo r th e [fair use ] privilege lies in the constitution al purpose in gran ting copyright protection in th e first instance, to wit,

21. Tonson v. Walker 3 Swans. (App .) 672,680 ( 1752). ("Argum ents from public utility m ay
b e urged o n both sides; but if this were more d o ubtful still it is cl ear that injuncti on o u ght to
be gran ted, beca use the n o tes were co lourab ly abridged or take n ... an d o nly twenty-eigh t
were add ed . . .. ")
22. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 184 1) (No. 4,09 1) .
23 . !d. a t 344-45.
24. !d.
25. See Patry, supra note 3, at 23 ("The error in mod ern fa ir use li tigation-avoid ed in Folsom
v. lvfa rsh- i s to stan with prec isely th e "publi c inte rest" inquiry, whi c h may be expressed in the
question, "Does the publi c interest favor enforcing pl ain tiffs cop yrig ht ~" justi ce Stor y did n ot
make th e e rror of balancin g the inte rests of th e author and th e public, but instead examined
whe th er "defenda nts usc qualified as fair use with the fu ll burden of making ou t an affirmative
defen se properl y res tin g on the d efe nda nt "' [e mphasis in the origin al]) .
26. More sp ecifically, the clefend an ts copi ed ::1 19 letters of Presid e nt Washington that were
includ ed in the original work. Th ey die! not copy any of th e narrative pans . The d efe ndant 's
book co nta ined 866 pages a nd was writte n in the form oLm autobiograph y. The orig ina l wo rk
co nsi sted of twe lve \·o Jum es.
27. 306 F.2d 30:1 (2cl Cir. l%6) quoting Be rlin\. E. C. Public a tions In c. , 329 F. 2d :)4 1, 544
(2 ncl Cir. 1964).
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'To Promote the Progress of Sc ie n ce and the Usefu l Arts." .. . To serve that
p urpose, "co urts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must
occas ionally subordinate the copyright holde r' s inte rest in maximum fin a ncia l re turn to the greate r public interest in th e cle,·elopment of art, scien ce
an d inclustry. "'2S

Since Rosemont, utilitarian co nsid erations have been gaining ground at the
expe n se of fairness. Ye t, n otio n s of fairn ess ha\·e continu ed to figur e in fair
use cases alo ngside utilitarian n otions. ?9 Th e fair use d oc trine has b ecome
a h otc hp otc h of fairness and utility. Instead of clarify ing the con tours of the
fair use d oc trine, the shift from fairness to effic ie ncv has resulted in a
qu a ndary.
Congress contributed to th e fair use conundrum when it codified th e fair
use doctrine in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The statutory provision is b est described by Weinreb:
I

Having indicated th a t it did not intend to alter th e pri o r law or inhibit its
furth e r judicial developm e nt, Congress adopted three co n siderably inconsistent ways of doing nothing : simple reference to fair use, specification of wh a t
is fa ir use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive "factors
to be co nsidered" in determining whether a particul ar use is fair.30

Th e problem with the statutory provision is that it says too much and too
littl e at the same time. 31 It neither defines "fair use" nor formulates a test
of fairn ess. Instead, the section provides a non-exh austive list of illustrative
u ses-such as comment, criticism, scholarship, research, news reporting,
and teaching-that may qualify as non-infringing u ses, and then it enumer28. !d. at 307. It is importan t to n ote that the court negl ec ted to m e ntion that the Constitution intende d to "Promote the Progress of Science and Usefu l Arts, by securing for limite d
Tim es to Authors and Inventors th e exclusive Right to th e ir respecti,·e Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Con st. Art. I sec. 8, cl. 8 (emph asis added).
29. See generally Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg, CO P'tRJ CHT FOR THE NINETIES. CASES
Ai\D MUERJAI.S. 55 1-54 (4th e el. 1993 ) .
30. Weinreb, supra note 1, a t 11 39 (footnotes omitte d).
31. In its e ntirety,§ 107 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisio n s of section 106, th e fair use of a copyrighted work,
incl uding such use by r eproductio n in copies or phon o r ecords or by any other m ean s
specifi ed by that section , for purposes such as criticism , com m ent, news reporting,
teaching (including multipl e cop ies for classroom use), sc h o lars hip , or research, is n ot
an in frin gement of copyrigh t. In determining wheth er the use m a de of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considere d sh all include( 1) the purpose and charac te r of the use, including wh e th er such use is of a commercia l nature or is for nonp rofi t ed ucational purposes;
(2) the na ture of the copyrig hted work;
(3) the amo unt and substantial ity of th e portion used in relation to the copyr ig hte d
work as a whole; and
(4) th e effec t of the use up on the potential market for or ,·,due of the copyTightecl
work.
17

u.s.c. ~

107 (1994 ).
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ares four factors to be weighed by the courts in deciding wheth e r a particular use is fa ir. The factors sp ecified in the section are: ( l) the purpose of th e
use, including its commercial or n o n-com m e rcial nature; (2) th e nature of
th e protected work of th e pl aintiff; (3) the amount ;:mel imp orta n ce of th e
parts that were reproduced; and ( 4) th e impact of the use on "th e potential
marke t or th e value of th e copyrighted work. "
The statutory text gives ri se to various problems. It remains uncl ear how
th e illustrative uses and the list of factors are to be reconc il ed; wheth e r all
four factors ought to be satisfied for a fair use to b e grante d; how much
weight each of the four fac tors is to be accorded in cases of cont1ict; wh e ther
additional factors can be considered and what they are . Even more vexing
is th e fact that th e statutory formulation fails to specify an underlying
principle th at should guide th e courts in h ard cases. In sum, without an
underlying principle, the statutory language offers very littl e purchase on
th e question of fair use. Even so , when the legislation emerged ther e existed
a forlorn hope that th e courts, most notably the Suprem e Court, would fill
in the statutory void and provide the missing prin ciple . This hope did not
materialize.
Virtually all commentators agre e tha t the Supreme Court fail ed to apply
consistently the statutory provision and th at its assay to make sense of it only
added to its preexisting a mbiguity.:~~ Unable to d ecide which of the four
fa ctors should control when th ey conflict, the Court vacillated among the
various factors, and after a d ecade of confusing statements:l:l concluded that
"the more transformative th e n ew work, the less will be the significance of
other factors ... that may weigh against a finding of fair use. "?.4 Furtherm o re , the Court did not confine itself to the statutory criteria. In particular,
th e Court clearly indicated that fairn ess and custom are still p ertinent to
th e fair use analysis d espite the fact that section 107 makes no mention of
them .35 At the end of the day, the Supreme Court's interpretation of th e
statutory provision is of very little value. Aside from exploring the four
statutory factors and adding some extraneous ones, the Suprem e Court
d ecisions provide very limited insights into the foundations of th e doctrine.
The various decisions provide neither a coherent theory nor a serviceable
yardstick by which to understand what fairness m eans or requires in this
context. More regrettable is the fact that the Court has not even attempted
to illuminate whether fairn ess or efficiency should control the fair use
mqmr y.
32 . Si'P, e.g. , Fish e r, supm note 10; Jay Dratl er Jr. , Distillinr; the Witrhes' HIPw of Fair Use in
CojJ_lTi[;hl I.aw, 43 U. ML1.\II L. Rn·. 233 (1988) [hereinafter: Dratler]; also We inre b , suj;m
n ote 1.
33 . In Sony, .Justice Stevens writing for th e majority sta ted that e\·e ry commercial u se is to be
pres um ed unfair. 464 U. S. a t 451. A vear late r in H rnjJI'r & Row Justice O ' Co nn o r writin g for
th e majority bra nd ed th e fourth faCLor-th e effe([ of th e second use on th e pot e nti a l marke t
for th e origina l \\·ork-as "the single mos t imp ortant clement of fair usc." 471 U.S. at :J 56 .
;q_ Crnnpl;e(/, :dO L'.S. at 579.
30 . Hrn jwr & How, 4 71 U.S. at :)b:Z -6~. St'l' also Fi sher, suj;ra n o te 10, at 1679- 82 .
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The current state of affairs exacts a hca\V toll on authors and users of
intellectual works as well as on the public at large. In its present form the
fair use doctrine significantlv adulterates the right of authors over their
work. Furthermore, it impairs the abilitv of authors and users to ascertain
their respective rights and privileges vis-a-vis one another. This in turn may
lead to underproduction or diminished use of intellectual works. The
incoherence of the doctrine mav also g-enerate excessive litig:ation}li
Against this backdrop, several attempts have been made to rid the doctrine of its incoherence and provide a principled test for cleterrnining fair
use. It is to these attempts that I now turn.
/

(_..J

l__)

II. ECON O M IC EF FICIE NCY AN D COMMUN ITARI ANISM

The existing literature offers two theories that seek to explain and justify
the fair use doctrine: economic efficiency and communitarianism. Economic efficiency is both a positive and a normative theory. As a positive
theory, economic efficiency is aimed at demonstrating that law can be best
understood in wealth-maximizing terms. As a normative theory, economic
efficiency endorses the claim that "law should be made to conform as
closely as possible with the dictates of wealth maximization.":\/ By contrast
to economic efficiency theories, communitarian theories are committed
neither to the concept of wealth maximization nor to marginalist models of
thinking. Instead, these theories seek to promote social solidarity by inculcating certain qualities and ideas that are deemed virtuous. Because communitarian theories put a premium on forming better communities and
enhancing certain values, for the communitarian the individual is not the
focal point, but is rather a repository of the interests of the community.
Although the two theories differ widely, they do have something in
common. Neither economic efficiency nor communitarianism takes individual rights seriously. Both theories are willing to accommodate individual
rights only to the extent that doing so will promote the values these theories
seek to advance. Neither theory accords independent weight to rights, and
both maintain that individuals can be used to advance the interests of
others without securing right holders' consent. Economic efficiency sacrifices individual rights on the altar of wealth maximization. Communitarianism is prepared to sacrifice the interests and rights of the individual to
promote communitarian values. Both economic efficiency and communi-

36. Ser Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry inln the Merits nf Copyright: ThP Challnzgps of Conlistmn.
Consf!lt, and Encoumgrmnzt Thmry, 41 ST.\N. L. RrY 1343, 1372 (1989) [hereinafter: Gordon,
An Inquiry].
37. Richard A. Posner, THE PlWBLE\IS OF J L' R.ISI'IZL'Dl-:N<E 362 ( 1990). The term "we alth" in
'·wealth maximization " is clef! ned as "the sum of all tangible and intangible goods and services
\leigh ted by pric e s of two su ns: o ffer p rices (what peopl e arc willing to pa\' for goods they clu
not alreadv own); and askin g prices (what people d e mand to sell what they own)." /d. at 356.
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tarianism violate the Kantian impe rative to treat rational individuals as ends
in th emselves and not mere ly as means. :'.K
In the following paragraphs I will explore both the theoretical a nd the
practical merits of th e various acco unts whi ch suggest that fair use should
be grounded in eco nomic efficie n cy or co mmunitarian principles. In evalua ting each ,·iew I will foc us on three qu es tions: Is it theoretically coherent?
Can it possibly be applied by co urts to d ecid e fair use cases? Does it ex plain
prnailing legal practices?
A. Eco nomic Effi c ien cy

American co pyright law has a utilitarian hue .:'·9 Th e utilitarian view of copyright is sustained by the constitutional lang uage and is widely shared by copyright scholars. ·1° Non et heless, two points bear emph asis: First, the doctrin e of
fair use is a judicial creati o n that evolved by a process of accretion independently of th e constitutional text. Second, nothing in the constitutional
text or the statutory wording supports the extension of the utilitarian view to
the fair use doctrine. 4 1 Th e last point merits elaboration. Judge Leva!, for
one, argues that the first statutory factor, which looks to whether th e use is
productive or transformative, countenances a utilitarian construction of the
fair use doctrin e : l2 This argument is flawed , however. Transformative or productive uses may result in improved , unchanged, or diminished utility. Consider, for example, the case of vitriolic reviews of books or movies. Doubtless,
such reviews are transformative, yet the harm they cause to the author of the
reviewed work can outweigh the benefits they generate. The converse is also
true. Untransformative reproductions of works can sometimes be socially important. This holds true when the original work has not been published or
has been kept away from the public1 ~ Nor does the fourth statutory factor-the effect of th e second use on the pote ntial market for the original
work-point to utilitarianism. The sale of unauthorized copies of a copy38. See Immanue l Kant, Fl;NllA ~ llNTAl. PRii'\ClPI.ES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 46 (Thomas
K. Abott tran s., 1949). For a discussion of this principle, see gennrtlly]effrie G. Murphy &Jules
L. Coleman, PHII.OSOPHYOF L-\\Y 77-81 (revised eel. 1990) [hereinafter: Murphy and Coleman].
39. SPe gt'nemlly, Paul Goldstein, CoPYRJ(;Hrs HICH\\'.\Y 165-196 (1994) [hereinafter: Goldstein , Cop vrig ht's Hig hwav] .
40. Sel', t'.g., LeYa l, sujna note 2; Fisher, supm note 10 ; a nd Gordon, Fair Use, sufna note 10.
However, J e r e my \1\'alclron ohserYes that "rilt seems psyc hologicallv unavoidable that rights
g rounde d in utility will be taken as ends in themse lYes: too mu ch emphasis on th e utilitari an
character of the pre mises ca n und ermin e people 's sense that it is a right (as o pposed , say, to
some defeasible presum pti on or rul e o f thumb) that is ground eel in thi s ,,·ay. "J e remy Waldron,
From Autlum to Copien: fnrlividua / R igh ts a nd Social \ia fu l's in lntdlertual ProjJni\', 68 CHI.- K£:-.!T L.

Rn. 842, 8:JJ (1993).
41. \1\'einre b , .1 ujm1note l , at 1141.
42. Le1·al, supm note 2, a t llll.
4::\. See, e.g., Tirn e Inc.,.. Bernard Geis Assoc iates, 29 3 F. Supp. L\0 (S.D.N.Y 1968), wh e re
the public inte rest in ha1·in g as mu ch infor111ati on as possible on the assassinati o n or President
Kenn edY \l·ei ghecl h c~ \\·ill' in L\\or o [ ~dlolling th e in cu rporaLi o n or unique pictures of the
murd e r in a hook on that subject; ({{so We inreb, .1ujm1 n o te l , at II :13.
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righted work may, in some cases, enhance social we lfare by reducing the market price of the work. E\·en so, the sale of such copies would be regarded as
unfair under the fourth factor since it would adversely affect the potential
market for the original work. The fourth factor is concerned solely with the
distributive effects of a fair use finding.
Neve rtheless, two comprehensive accounts that ground fair use in economic efficiency can be found in the academic literature. The first is
advanced bv' vVendv' Gordon and th e second bv' William Fisher.
1. Fair Use as i'vfadwt Failure

vVendy Gordon suggests that courts should "see k[] a base for fair use in
structural and economic considerations. "-H She begins with the paradigm of
the perfect market. 4 5 vVhen markets are perfectly competitive, resources
gravitate through consensual exchanges to their highest value users, and
efficiencv is therebv maximized. In the real world , however, the conditions of
perfect markets cannot be satisfied; thus, markets arc fraught with imperfections, or as Gordon, following conventional discourse, calls them, "market
failures." When the market fails one can no longer rely on consensual exchange to result in the socially desirable allocation of resources. ·Hi Therefore,
Gordon concludes that in the presence of market failures, courts should
promote efficiency by emulating the perfectly competitive markets. That is,
they should vest the legal right in the party who would have acquired it
through the market if it had been feasible. By the same token, the doctrine of
fair use should be employed to correct for market failures. Namely, courts
should award fair use whenever the second use is socially desirable.-±7 Gordon
then crafts a three-step test for recognizing when fair use should be awarded:
j

'

(l) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to the defendant is
socially desirable [i.e., results in a net gain in social value]; and (3) an award
of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff
copyright owner.-lR

The first problem with Gordon's account concerns her understanding of
efficiency. Although some economists define efficiency abstractly, others,
like James Buchanan, insist that the notion of economic efficiency has to be
defined relative to a particular institutional framework. 49 According to
Buchanan, efficiency is the outcome of voluntary trade under certain given
44. Gorclon, Fair Use, sujJm note 10, at 1601.
45. Jd. at 1605-6.
46. !d. at Hi07, 16Hi.
47. !d. at Hi13.
48. !d. at 1614.
49. See, P.g.,Jun es ]\ !.Buchanan, Politics, Policy nnrlthe f\srn'iau i\IrnpJIIS, :29 Ec0:\0\IIC\ 17,
19 ( 196:2) ('To argue that an exi sting order is 'imperfect' in com pari son with an a! ternati\·e
order of affairs that turns out upon careful inspecti o n to be unatlainahlc may not he diffe rent
from arguing that the c:-.:isting ord e r is pe rfect''); .1 ulcs L. Coleman , Risks .·\:\ll \\'rzo:\cs 87-1 02
(l9Sl2 ) [hereinafter: Coleman : Ri sks a nd Wrongsl: :Vlurph\· and C:okman, sujno note c'.8 ,
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conditions. H ence , the o utco m e of vo lun tar y exchange in a market like
ours , which is ridden with transaction costs an d imperfections, is as efficie nt
as the o utco m e of a similar exchange under pe rfec t mark e t co nditi o n s.
Bot h outc omes a re effici e nt. If th e Buchanan view is th e rig ht o ne , the quest
for efficien cy is frivolous and the e ntire doctrin e of fa ir use is un prin cipled
for it on ly ac ts to redistribute wealth from o rig inal auth o rs to subsequent
u se rs. so Becau se th e debate abo u t th e correc t unde rstanding of efficiency
h as n ever been se ttl ed , I will proceed to examin e the th ree cond iti o ns of
Go rdon 's tes t.
a. i'vfadwt failure. The first conditi o n th at h as to be m e t is prese nc e of a
marke t fa ilure. In h e r article, Go rd o n id e ntifies thre e types of m arket
failures th at pl agu e the market for copyrighted works: a nti-disse min a tion
motives, p ositive externalities, and transactio n costs.s l
T h e first m a rket failure id e ntified by Gordon results fr om an ti-dissem in ati on motives. According to Gordon, the problem of anti-disse min a tion
m o tives arises whenever a copyright owner is disposed to forgo a n economic
gain in order to retain control over the flow of the informatio n that is
embodied in his or h e r work. 52 Although it is true that sometimes co pyright
owners m ay be so disposed, a nti-disse min ation motives by themselves are
simply not a m arket failure. A market failure occurs when a u ser who values
an asse t m o re than its owner cannot secure it through a voluntar y exchange. Becau se it is a consequentialist th eor y, economi c effi cien cy is concerned exclusively with outcomes. It does n ot inquire into the motives of
th e tra nsactors. Accordingly, th e anti-dissemin ation motives of the cop yrig ht own er are irrelevant. No infere nces as to th e relative value to the
owner o f th e copyright, o n the one h an d, an d the seco nd use r and society,
on th e other, can be drawn from the refusal of th e owner to disseminate
on e' s work. If the benefit the owner derives fr om keeping th e work to
oneself exceeds the combin ed benefits of th e second user and the public at
larg e, the own er should re tain th e work.
The second market failure m en tion e d by Gordon is positive exte rnalities.S3 As Gordon correctly observes, the info rm a tion contained in intellec-

at 2:28-29; Jul es L. Coleman , The Foundations ol Constitutional l:,·wnomirs, in CONSTITUTIONAL
EcoNm iics: CoNTAI NINC THE E coNO~ II C PowERS o r Gon:RN.\tE NT (Ric h ard McKe nzie eel. , 1984);
also Barbara White , Coase and the Courts: F.mnomirs for the Common Nirm, 72 low. \ L RE\'. 577,
603-4 (1987) ("In fac t a fu ndamenta l theorem of economics is that every society with a given
am o unt o f r eso urces faces a m u ltipli city of e conomically effi cient sta tes from which to choose;
th e parti cul ar e ffici e nt sta te towa rd which soci ety gravi tates refle c ts that soc ie ty's value").
50. Th is applie s with equal vigor to Fi sher' s ac count th a t will be discusse d b e low; see tex t
acco mpanying notes 75- 82.
5 1. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 10, at 1627-?>5.
52 . lrl. a t 1632- 33.
53 . Externa liti es are th e effects of o ne 's acti\·ir.ies on oth ers· activiti es a nd en titlements. For
a !II Ore e labora te disc ussio n of the pro blem o f exte rn a li ti es sec Ri cha rd Corncs & Todd Sandler,
Tt-tr TH EO RY oF ExtTR:-\.\ t.ITILS, PL'Bt.tc: Coo ns .-\:-\ ll Ct.t: ll Coo iJs 29- G() (1986) [herein a fter:
Cornes a nd Sa ncll e r ] .
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tual works confe rs benefits not on ly on purch asers but a lso on third parti es.
In te llectual works stimulate d e bate and discussion , which benefit th e entire
cornmun iry. s-r Neverthel ess, eco nomists note that th e problem of externaliti es on its own is hardly compe lling.:'l:J Nor do es it necessarily call for
inte n e ntion in the market.S6 \Nh e n transaction costs ar e low and prop e rty
rights are well defined , th e probl e m of extern al ities simp ly docs n ot arise .s7
But eve n conce din g th at th e existe nce of ex te rn al benefits is a marke t
failur e thatjustifies inte rve ntion , it re mains uncl ear how awarding fair use
h e lps co mbat the probl e m. The solution to th e p roble m of externalities is
inte rnalization. Intern ali za tion can be achieved e ith er by governm e nt interv e ntion :~,fl or, when transactio n costs are low, by private n egotiations
be twe e n the affected parti e s. :-i~ 1 In the copyright contex t, the internaliza tion
of ex te rn al benefits th at authorship generates can be accomplish ed by
subsidiza tion of authorship and other creative activiti es. The doctrin e of fair
use, h o·weve r, is an in adequate m eans for subsidizing authorship. A fair use
award can be viewed as a subsidy to subsequent authors at the exp e nse of
previous o n es.6° But, absent empirical evidence to th e contrary, th e be n efits
that subsequent authors reap from the existence of the doctrine might b e
outweighed by the h arms suffered by original authors. Therefore, as b etween authors the impact of the fair use doctrin e as a m eans of subsidizin g
auth orship is indeterminate. It should be emphasized, though, that th e fair
u se privilege extends not o nly to authors but also to a vast number of u se rs
who are not engaged in authorship or creative activi ty of any sort, and it
allows them to avail th emselves of existing inte llectual works without comp e n sating the authors of th ese works. Conseque ntly, for users who are not
auth ors, the fair privilege creates opportunities for "free-riding." Thus, in
the final tally, it appears that the fair use doctrin e may well be ill-suited to
internalize the external effects of authorship and creativity.
The third type of poten ti al market failure is high transaction costs. That
high transaction costs stifle the effective operation of markets for inte ll ec-

54. To d e te rmine whether copyright protection generates ex te rna l costs and ex te rn a l be n efits, we first have to clearly define th e terms "cost" and "ben efit. " For an illuminating discussion
of th e subject see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, ivfisrhief and J'vii,fortzuu (A nnual M rGill
L ecture in JurisjJrudencP and Public Policy) , 41 McGILL L. J. 91 ( 1995) [hereinafter: Coleman a nd
Ripstein].
55. See, P);., Steven N. S. Ch e ung, T'/w Stnu:turp of a Contmrl and the Thmry of a Non-f"'xrlusive
ResounP, 13 J. L. & Ec:oN. 49, 70 ( 1970) (concluding that" [ t] h e co nce pt of "ex tern ality" is vag ue
because classification and theo ries [th e reof] are varied, arbitrary and rut hoc. For these reasons,
th eories generated by the con cep t of "externality" are not liab le to be he lpful "); also, J ames M .
Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubble bin e, Extemality, 29 EcoNOMIC.\ 37 1 (1962).
56. See, eK, Carl]. Dahlma n , Th e Prol!lrm oJExtnn ality, 22 ]. L. & Ec:oN. 141 , 143 (1979) ("It
cannot be shown with purelv co n ce ptual analysis that ma rke ts d o no t handle exte rn aliti es: a ny
such assertion necessitates a n assumption that the governm e nt can clo better") .
57. Paul A. Samuelson & ·william Norclhaus, Et:O NO!I II C:S 3 14 (14th e el. 199:2 ).
58. lr/. a t 310-15.
59. Ro nald :ti. Coase, Fh r J>m!Jlm t ofS"orial Cost, :1 J. L. & Ec:oN. I ( 19()0).
60. Sw Sonv, 4()4 tTS. at 479 ( Blackmu n , J dissenting ).
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tual works is indisputabl e . In sofar as copyrighted works are conce rn ed, th e
cost of consummating a mark e t transacti on ofte n exceeds by far th e valu e
of the co pyrighted material to the po tenti al user. Moreove r, high m o nitoring and litigati on cos ts pre clud e authors from e nforcing their le gal rights
against infringers. Howeve r, th e problern o f transaction cost is not impregn able.
A possi ble soluti on to the problem of transaction costs comes in th e form
of technological innovatio ns . Paul Goldste in reports that in the near future
n ew technol ogies will substan ti a lly reduce negotiation costs b e tween
authors and users. Moreover, they vvill also allow authors to police unauthorize d users and exclude nonpaye rs . He sugges ts that in light of this techn ological revolution , the fa ir use d oc trin e should be abrogated, or, at a
minimum, be con strued ve r y narrowly.hl
A diffe rent solution to the transaction cost probl e m is the formati o n of
legal institutio ns th a t act to reduce transaction costs and streamlin e transactions. In the fi eld of copyright law th ese functions are perfo rmed by
institutions such as ASCAP and CCC. 6~ Th ese institutions comba t th e proble m of transac tion costs in two diffe rent ways. First, by cre ating po ols of
co pyrighted works63 th ey allow licensees to pay a prede termined fee and in
return gain access to an entire repertoire of protected works without additional charges. Second , by collectively e nforcing the rights of authors
against infringers they economize on policing and litigation costs. 54 Therefore , in the presen ce of such institutions the question for proponents oflaw
and economics is not wh e n fair use should be awarded, but rather, why have
th e fair use doctrin e at a ll?65
More astounding is th e fact that not only law and economics proponents
but virtually all commenta tors seem to agree that, absent transaction costs,
fa ir use should be abolished. 6 ti In effec t, th ey all suggest th a t authors' ability
to charge should be th e test for fair use: Wh en authors can charge for
6 1. Goldstein , Co pyright 's Highway, .1ujmL note 39, a t 223-24; see alw Paul Goldstein , CojJ)'right in the New !njimnation Age, 40 C.-\TH. U. L. R. 829, 829 (1991) [h e reinafte r: Goldstein ,
Copyright in th e New Inform ation Age ].
62. ASCAP, th e Am e ri ca n Society of Compose rs Authors and Publish e rs, is a copyright
co llective that license s rights fo r publi c p erform ance of m usical works. CCC, the Copyright
Clearing h o use Center, li censes the right to re produce literar y works. For a compre h e nsive
review see David Si n acore-G uinn , Col.l.ECTI\'E ADMlNISTR.\TI ON or COPWI GHT .-\ N D NE IGH BORlNG
RIGHTS (1993).
63 . To becom e m embe rs in such in stitu tio ns , cr eators o ught to assi g n the rig hts to their
wo rks to th e in stitution a nd a u thori ze it to li ce nse th e wo r ks as it sees fit.
64. See generall.\' Robert P. Me rges, Co ntmrling into I.iability Rules: Instit utions SujJporting Transaction in !ntellertual ProjJerty Rights, 84 CA L. L. REv. 1293 ( 1996) .
65 . This is because the e xiste nce of the fa ir use doctrin e threa tens to thwart the effective
operation o f copyri g ht co llectives like ASCAP a nd CCC. Indeed, if fair u se is to be awarde d too
ge nerously, copyright co ll ec ti ves wi II be un able to co ll ect an v revenu es as users will a lways resort
to fa ir usc argum ents to avoid payin g.
66. Sr•r', r.g., Go ldstein , Copvrig ht 's Highway, sujml n o te 39, at :223-24; Dratler, sujna note 32,
a t 294 (" It makes no sense to prm·idc a fa ir usc su bsicly to a use r II' h e n a li ce nse cou ld be
ctfic ien tly negotia ted "); also A1neri ca n G eo physi ca l Lin ion v. Texaco In c:., 802 F. Su p p. I
(S D :--J.Y 1992), af{il, 37 F. 3d 88 1 (:2cl Cir. 1994)
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subsequent uses, fair use should never be granted. This test , however, is
extremely odd, as the ability to charge by itself cannot possibly determine
lega l rights. A hoodlum might have the ability to charge protection fees
from businesses, and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a
right to do that. Similarly, I may be able to sell to you a car that does not
belong to me, but it does not follow that I am justified in so doing. Absent
an underlying theory of rights, the ability to charge is normatively meaningless. Therefore, to suggest that fair use is nothing but a means to overcome
the problem of transaction costs is misconceived and ill-founded.
Champions of economic efficiency will invariably disapprme of the
above analogies. After all, from an economic standpoint, the point and
purpose of copyright protection is to secure sufficient returns to creative
authorship, and if the fair use doctrine vitiates this goal it should simply
be abolished, and authors should be entitled to charge for each and every
use of their works. The problem with this argument is that it cannot be
sustained by any empirical evidence. Prior to the introduction of any farreaching changes in the existing copyright system it is useful to recall
George Priest's quintessential caveat that "[i]n the current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the effect on social welfare
of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property. "67 Therefore, the claim that the abolition of the fair use doctrine will enhance
social welfare is merely an assumption that cannot support an adequate
basis for normative recommendations. Furthermore, the abolition of fair
use may not even be in the best interest of authors. As William Landes
and Richard Posner point out, previously produced works act as raw materials in the production of new works; thus, the elimination of fair use
will make copyrightable works more costly to produce.68 This leads them
to the conclusion that from the point of view of authors, optimal copyright
protection should be weaker than complete. Therefore, the call for abolishing the fair use doctrine is problematic even when viewed through the
lens of economic efficiency.
b. Desirability of the transfer. According to Gordon the second condition
that must be met is that an award of fair use should effect net social gain.
To determine whether this condition is satisfied the courts are required to
weigh the loss to the original author and to similarly situated authors
against the gains of the second user and society as a whole. It is questionable, however, that courts are capable of conducting this cost-benefit analy67. George Priest, \;\1/wt l~mnomisls Can 71,/l Lmuyen abont Intellectual ProjJerty, in 8 RESEARCH IN
EcoNO:VIICS: THE Ec:oNOi\IJCS OF PuENTS v-:u CoPYRIGHTS 21 (I. Palmer & R. Zerbe eds.,
1986). Likewise, Timothy Brennan appears to be right to conclude that "[a] full economic
evaluation or copyright policy is impossible because the complexitv or compe6tive interaction
and demand substitutions among copyrighted works is beyond the capability of economic
theory or clara to generate cost-benefit analyses.·· Tirnotll\'.J. Brennan, Cop_vright, Fmpnty rtnd the
Right to Dmy, 68 C111.-KENT. L. Rn . 675.704 n.l01 (1993).
68. 'vVilliam tv!. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A 11 l:'crmomir i lnrt!ysis of Coji!Tight !JtW, 18 J
lxc.\J.. Sn ' D. :12:'1 , 34 1 ( 1989).

L-\\1' .\ND

Fair Use, Effic iency, Co rrecti ve justice

361

sis. 1i' 1 Practicability h ;ts been , a nd still remains, the proverbial Achill es' h ee l
of law and eco nomi cs. In th e case at hand , three uniqu e features make a
cost-benefit calc ulus es pecially diffi c ult. First, intell ec tual works involve an
e mo tio nal dim ension that can not be assessed in monetary terms. Second,
courts a re required to ,·alue the social gain (or loss) not only to th e parti es
in th e case but also to the public at large. Third, co urts must m easure the
losses (or gains) of potential authors who are similarl;' situated to the
plaintiff in the case at bar. The qu estio n is: Can \Ve practically expect courts
to p erfo rm this calculus successfully? I am afraid that this questi on should
be answered negativeh'. vVhen th e interests of so many third parties are
involved, even a rough cost-benefit a nalysis is simply impracticable.
Th e impracticability probl ern cuts much deeper, for it is the second users,
not th e courts, who are supposed to perform this calculus in the first place.
It is unrealistic to suggest that users will b e able to imm erse themse lves in
this intricate calculus when ever th ey have to d ecide wh e ther to use a
copyrighted work. Therefore, efficiency cannot guide courts and use rs
through the fair use maze.

c. The substantial injlll} limitation. Gordon's third condition-that the
fair use award will not result in substantial injury to the a uthor-appears
either otiose or incongruent with her framework of analysis. From an
efficiency point of view, the injury to the original author has no importance
per se. Obviously, it is a factor that must be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis, but on its own, th e injury to th e original author is not determinative. If, however, this condition carries independent clout one should
wonder how it squares with the underlying goal of economic analysis.
Gordon elucidates the need for this limitation:
Th e substantial injury hurdl e serves several functions. First, it preserves the
incentive syste m at the core of copyright. Second , it refl ec ts a recognition that
judgments co urts make about whether a defendant 's use is value maximizing
are rough approximations . . . . Third, awarding copyright ovvners a veto
wh enever their injur y is substantial gives so me guarantee that th e fair use
system will not put them at an intolerable disadvantage./0

The inclusion of th e third condition not only injects vagueness into Gordon's account but also renders it somewhat incoh erent. If economic efficiency should be th e benchmark in fair use cases, then the third condition
is a non sequitur. If, on the other hand, economic analysis cannot unravel
the fair use puzzle, why should courts follow Gordon's recommendation to
look to principles of economic efficiency? For if the rights of authors and
b9 . For a normati1·e di scussion of the institutional aspects of law ancl e con omi cs , srP.Jul es L.
Co lem an , !jfirim ry. Utility a nd 1\'m /th Mrnimizotion. i1 Hmsm.\ L. RE\. 509, :"'>4Sl ( 1980) (a rg-uin g
that ew~ n if economic eflic ienc1· should be maximized it cloes not follow th;ll courts ;mel agents
should act to t hi .-; effect '' i thou t "'a further theory of institutional co m pctcncc '").
70. Conlon , F;1ir Lise . .llljmln o te I 0, ar Hi 19 (footnotes omitted).
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copyright owners trump effic ie ncy conside rati o n s, th e n a normative justificat io n for the doctrine sh o uld be so ught in theori es of j ustice , not economi c efficie ncvJl
Gordon's acc ount is in te nsion with itself. Its b asic normative fram ework
is problematic ancl inadequate lv motivated. Moreover, it fails to accoun t for
th e fu ll range of existing lega l practices .
To b e sure, Gordon makes a limited claim for the capacity of her view to
explain ex isting practi ces. Sh e does n o t cl a im that her view co mports
perfectly with the case law. Ind ee d , sig nific ant portions of the existing law
cannot be reconciled with her framewo rk. Three examples stand out: protection of unpublished works, parodies and reviews. U ncler the existing law,
th e unpublish ed nature of the work militates strongly against a fair u se
findi ng. 7'2 Such works gen e rate no soc ial utility, but nonetheless they enjoy
a high er degree of protection. Often publication of suc h works against th e
own er's will might enhanc e soc ial welfare. Accordin gly, th e attitude of
courts toward unpublish ed wo rks cannot be exp lain ed on efficiency
grounds. 73 Reviews and parodi es g ive rise to a different problem. Sarcastic
reviews and parodies usually inf1i ct an irreparabl e h arm upon creators and
mi ght undermine their in ce ntive to produce inte ll ectual works in th e future.'-+ Such reviews and p arodies vary enormously in their importance to
society depending on th ei r conte nt, and, as such, they may not enh a n ce
social welfare enough to offset the obvious and large costs they impose .
Neverth eless, there is littl e doubt that such uses are fair.
I

2. The Ince·n tive/Loss Ratio
Like Gordon , ·william Fisher also touts economic efficie ncy as a possibl e
solution to the existing fair use quandary. Unlike Gordon, however, Fish er
do es not claim that the existing case law is defensible on efficiency grounds.
71. Indeed, Avery Katz conclud es in a recent article that

Modern Neoclassical welfare economics ne,·er was suited to the task of co n structi ng a
normative ord er for law. A normative con cept [of econom ic efficienc y] rooted in
positivism and not even regarded as decisive in th e h o m e field [i.e., econom ics] h ardly
co uld serve as an organizing co ncept ror a separate di sc iplin e [i.e. , law] that traditi o nally trea ted n o rmative analysis as a central part of its task.
Avery Weine r Katz, Positivism and the Sl'j)({m/ion of Law and Fmnomics, 94 MICH. L. RE\". 2229,
2260-61 (1996)
72. HrlljJrr & Row, 471 U.S. a t 564: New f_'m Publimtions, 87~ F.2cl at 583; Salinger; 811 F.2cl at
97 (2cl. Ci r. ).
73. Indeed, William Land es suggests that from an economic efficiency perspecti1·e copyright protection or unpublished works create d fo r private purposes (i. e., that are not going to
be publish ed) should be r elative ly weak. William M. Lan d es , CojJyright Protertion of Ll'llers,
Diaries, and Othn Unjmblished Works: An l:"mnomir AjJjnoarh, 21]. Li::c.-\1. STLD. 79 ( 1992).
74. Empi ri ca l data in the contex t of libel ac ti o n s suggest that th e m <~j ority of libel ,·ictims
beli eve that mon e\' damages cannot make good th e ir injuri es. Twenty p e rcent of th e victims
believe that no remedy can aclequate lv redress their h arlll s. Sr'f Re ndall P. Bezanson, .J ohn
So loski & Gi lbert Cranberg, L mt-:1 L-111 .·\:\ll THE PRESS !Vl\"n-1 .\0/ll RL\l.ITY l-28 ( 1987) . Alfred
Yen mainta in s that these findin gs can be extende d to authors wh ose works han: been parodied
or ktrshh· rcvie11-ed. Alfred C. \ en, \\ hm ,·\uihurs \\i!ll.l Sell: I'rtmr(\', F(lir Use, 1/1/(/ Ijjl rienn in
C:oj;yn,!l,hll-rtw, 62 U. Col.(). L. Rt·\'. 7 ~1 , 10:>- 6 ( [LJ91 ) .
0
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Moreover, believing that th e prese nt state of' affairs is beyond repa ir h e sets
o u t to reconstruc t th e fair u se doc trin e acco rdin g to efficiency cons ideration s. Th e co re of Fish e r 's e nte rprise is th e in centive / loss ratio , wh ich he
offers as a benchmark for fai r use cases. 7·1 Basically, th e inc entive / loss ratio
is a sophisticate d way of co nducting a cos t-be nefit an a lysis . T h e numerato r
o f this fr action represe nts the monetary ret urn the origin al auth or could
reap if th e use in ques tio n we re h eld unfair and the auth o r could charge
payme nt for any such use. The d e nominator represents the resultin g lo ss to
soc iety from granting the auth or exc lusivity m·er the relevant use./6 Put
simply, the tes t co mpares potential loss to t h e au th or again st the po ten tial
loss to so cie ty. So far, Fish er's test is quite similar to Gordon 's second co n clition. He parts compa ny with Go rdon in re quiring courts not to confine
th emse lves to th e case at h and but rath e r to co n sid er all the possible uses of
a copyrighted wo rk in deciding a specifi c fair use case . In othe r wo rds, Fish e r
dema nds that courts "determine th e unive rse of activiti es vis-a-vis" the original work that might be con sidere d in fr inging./ 7 For example, if a detective
stor y can be the subj ec t of a book review, a parody, a computer game, and a
musical, courts must conside r all the se activities in eve r y fai r use case that
invo lves this story. Then courts should d evise an in cen tive/ loss ratio for
every such use and by ranking the various ratios d ecide which ac tiviti es
should b e deeme d fa ir and which should notJR Although Fish e r's account is
coh e rent, it is d esperately impracticable . Th e doubts abo ut th e practicability
of this view are best expressed by Fisher himself:
If such a comparative analysis must be employed in m ost cases, is n ot economic analysis in this doctrinal con text hop e lessly imp racticable? The discussio n of the highly stylized case presente d in sec ti on B was comp lex eno ugh .
If we removed the simplifying assumptions , limi ted judge's investigatory
power, an d burdened him with other cases, it wendel be ludicrous, surely, to
ask him to und er take an inquir y like the o n e o utlin e d above. Pe rh aps. It is
hard to imagin e a judge making even rough guesses at some of the figures
critical to th e calculus./9

In sum , Fisher's account is a stimul ating thought experim ent that d e monstra tes the analytical vigor of econ omic analysis a longside the diffi culties
involved in applying econ o mic principles to real-wo rld situatio ns.
75 . In man y respec ts Fisher's tes t paral le ls a tes t offere d by Louis Kaplow in th e co ntext of
pa tenLs. SrY Lo ui s Ka plow, Tlzl' P atmt-Antitmsl i l!lr'ISN!ioll: A RNtjJjJrrti.lal, 97 H-\R.\'. L. RE\'. 1813
( 1984) .
76. Fish er, sujmt n o te 10, at 1707 .
77. /d. at 1706.
78. Specificallv, Fisher suggests tha t cachjudge, after dn·isi ng an in centive / loss ratio for eac h
putati\el y in fr in ging use , sh o uld arrange the \·ario u s uses o n th e X-axis in orde r of th e ir ratios
ancl th e rc1ft cr pl ot a grap h of th e "[n] et imp act on eco nomi c effi cie ncy of forbidding eac h
su ccessive use ." Based o n this graph, th e judge has to dete r mine the usc at \l·h ich the nct-cfficienc\· cun·c peaks a nd th en declare all th e tt scs LO the ri g ht oft hi s p oi nt bir. a nd a ll the uses to
th c left uf th is point u n f~1ir. Fo r a gra ph ic d illusll ~ tti on oft his cl(ct erm ination , Sl'l' irl. at 17 Hi.
79. /d. a t l 7 1S.
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One last point on fair use and economic <malvsis bears emphasis. The
existing attempts to justif)' the fair use doctrine on economic efficiency
grounds are somewhat peculiar. The fair use doctrine establishes a strict ''all
or nothing" legal rule. The existing rule offers two extreme options: If a use
is fair, the second user can m·ail herself of it without compensating the
original author; if it is not, the second use will be enjoinecl. 00 In both cases
someone is harmed. A fair use finding inflicts harm on the original
author;sl an injunction deprives society of useful knowledge. In the context
of copyright law, it appears that economic efficiency could have been better
served had the fair use doctrine taken the middle ground by allowing
second users to use the original work and then compensate its author. Put
differently, in a market so rife with transaction costs and imperfect information , liability rules would probably outperform property rules in terms of
enhancing economic efficiency.1-1'2 Thus, economic analysis is at a loss to
explain why compensation should not be avvarded in fair use cases.
B. Communitarianism

A different approach to the fair use problem is presented by proponents of
communitarianism. Bv their li£hts, courts must turn to communitv interests
and values to determine what uses are fair. Joining Fisher in his criticism of
the existing interpretation of fair use, Linda Lacey recommends that courts
should focus the fair use inquiry on the public interest, namely the community interest.S~'l Accordingly, whenever an intellectual work is of considerable
value to the community, courts should employ the fair use doctrine to make
it available for the public. In other words, the greater the importance of a
work to the community, the weaker its copyright protection.s4 In Lacey's
view, the fair use doctrine should serve as a vehicle for taking from creators
j

LJ

J

80. Under the tvpolot,ry of Calahresi and Melamed , the fair use doctrine constitutes a
property rule, or at least a \·ariant thereof. Under their definition, a right is protected by a
propertv rule when a transfer of an entitlement requires the ex-ante consent of the holder
thereof. Liability rules protect entitlements by granting the owner a claim for compensation
whenever the value of the entitlements is diminished by the actions of other people . .'iee Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, f.iahi!ity Ru!Ps and fnolirna!Ji!ity: One Finu of the
C:athedmf. 85 H'.R\. L. RE\. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter: Calabresi and ::VIelamed].
81. The public also suflers an indirect loss when f~1ir use is awarded because any such
award-by the lights of economic analysis-aclyersely impacts the incentive of the original
author to create in the future.
82. For many years law and economics literature has suggested that wh e n transaction costs
are high , liabilitY rules are superior to property rules. Sre, r.g.. Calabresi and !vielamecl, sujna
note 80; Richard A. Posner, E<:0:\0\IIC: Ai\.\l.l:)JS OF L\\1" 57, 70 (4th eel. 1992). The most recent
writings in this field suggest, however, that liabilitY rules arc better suited to enhance economic
eff1ciencv than propertv rules under circumstances of imperfect information . .)'pe, e.g., Ian
An-cs & Eric Talley, .)'ufomonir lJrngoining,·: Dividing r1 f.egrd f~' ntilfl'lnml to Farifilo/e Cosmn FmriP,
104 Y\u L J I 027 ( 1995); also Louis KaplcN & Steven Sha\·cll, Pmjm /y Ru !es \)'!sus Uobility
nufes: , \nf~'mnr!lllil' , \nrrlnis, ]()() I-I.\R\·. L. Rn·. 713 (l9l)(i).
8c'l. Li nclaj. Laccv, sujna note 11, 1584-cn ( 1~m9).
8'!. lr/ at 1587.
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a nd giving to th e publi c with o ut even co mp ensat in g aut hors for th e ir losses.
Thi s view g ives rise to a variety of proble m s.
Firs t, h er a pp roach is unp r in cip led . In h er view, th e in te rest of suhse que n t
use rs o f in tell ectual goo d s and th e public at la rge should preva il over th e interests of origi nal a u th o rs, but abse nt an acco unt o Cwh:· this should be , the
re co mrn e ndation canno t sta nd . vVhy should a uth ors surrend e r th e ir rights,
inte res ts, a nd tal e nts to adva nc e the inte rests of th e public: Why sh o uld they
no t, a t ami nim um, b e corn pe nsate d fo r their labor? Lac ey atte mpts to an swe r
th ese qu es tion s by arguin g that the assum ptio n that auth o rs expe c t re muneration is flaw ed, but th e evidence she provides to supp ort this claim is inadequate. At best, h e r argum e nt proves th at wh en they make the d ec isio n to
create, some creators e xpect to be rewa rded whil e o th e rs do n o t. ~'' But e\·e n
co n cedin g that some auth o rs are n ot moved b y finan cial reason s, we still
mig h t ·wa nt to co mpe nsate them on gro unds ofbirness-whatever their exp ec ta tion s. Th e refore, her a rgum e nt cannot carr y the day.
Sec ond , Lacey 's view is susceptibl e to th e copyright paradox. Although
Lacey's approac h mig ht promote th e disse min ation of kn owledge in the
short run , it will likely de crease, o r in the extreme elimin a te, the dissemination of knowledge in th e lo n g r un. For if auth ors care about th e ir own
fin ancial we lfare th ey will put th eir creative efforts to rest. This, in turn, will
lead to a dramatic d ec rease in th e amount a nd quality of inte llectual works
avail able to the public. Thus, Lacey's en terprise might harm the very inte rest it see ks to pro tect.
Finally, Lacey assigns to the courts the rol e of d eciding wh at works are of
social impo rtan ce . But how are the courts to make this determination? H ow
does one recognize an importa nt intellectual work? In an oft-ci te d p aragraph, Justice Holmes warned th a t "[i] t would b e a dangerous und ertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute th e mselves fin al judges of the
worth of pictorial illustratio ns, outsid e of th e n arrowest and most obvious
limits. "Rti T his warning applies with equal force to other copyrightabl e works.
Lacey h erself offers ver y littl e guidance on this matte r. Sh e asserts th at "political informa tion which con tributes to th e deba te about the very nature of o ur
government and its p olici es, is of grea test valu e to a com muni ty. "i">7 This on its
own is n o t very helpfu l. Th e reafter, Lacey co ntends th at the Supreme Court
was clearly wro ng in holding th at off-the-air video taping constitutes fa ir
use .Rs This state ment begs the questio n. Television program s o ften provide
large a m o unts of political and otherwise valuable information. The availability of video tapes of television program s sure ly contributes to the wide dissemination of importan t info rmation , as it m akes these programs ava ilable to
85 . frl . at. J:J72. The d ata La cey o ffers suggest that 70 per cent o f th e a uth o rs \\'llo p ubli shed
at least o ne book are e n gage d in a nother 1mrk oth e r tha n writin g . No infe re n ces ca n be m a de

base d o n th ese data as to what impels a u tho rs to create . Th e usc of th ese d a ta to su pport the
a rgume nt that auth o rs d o no t expect monctan· IT\,·ards is hi gh h" inad equ;1t e.
sn. Blci ste in ,._ Do n a l d~on Li thograp hi c Co. , 188 U.S. 2:-\ll ( 1 90c~).
87. Lac ev, sujmt no te 1 J , at 1:)88 .
88. !d. at 1:)91.
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more viewers. vVhy, then, was the Supreme Court wrong? My point here is not
that the Supreme Court was right, but rather that deciding what is important
is completely idiosyncratic. It involves a value judgment that courts are ill-fitted to make. 1Nithout an objective benchmark, which Lacey fails to provide,
courts will face tremendous difficulties deciding uses of what works are to be
considered fair. Also, the importance criterion will likely spur enormous confusion among users .
At bottom, recourse to cornmunitarian values cannot solve the fair use
problem. vVithout a further theory, there is no apparent justification to
prefer the interests of the community over the rights of the individuals.
Moreover, Lacey's attempt to foster wider dissemination of knowledge runs
aground as it is subject to the proverbial copyright paradox. Hence, her
approach is , at least to some extent, incoherent. Finally, the benchmark of
importance is too vague and subjective, and thus provides almost no guidance as to how to determine what uses should be regarded fair.
Ill. RIGHTS, FAIR USE, AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

A. Rights and Fairness
To get a handle on the fair use problem, it is useful to begin with a rightsbased theory of copyright law-that is, a theory that treats rights in intellectual works seriously. A copyright is a property right in original works of
authorship. That the author has a property right in her works is of both normative and moral significance. The defining characteristic of rights is that
they erect moral barriers that others are not at liberty to cross.SSJ Robert Nozick, for instance, refers to rights as "side constraints" that "reflect the underlying K:1.ntian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means. "90
Ronald Dworkin characterizes rights as "political trumps held by individuals"
that protect individuals from unbridled pursuit of collective goals.9l Indeed,
according to the liberal tradition, the point and purpose of rights is to demarcate a domain of autonomy and control.92 Rights command respect even
when doing so would preclude the attainment of otherwise desirable consequences. Thus, as David Lyons points out "[i]f one accepts moral rights, one
cannot accept absolute guidance by welfare arguments."93 The same holds
true for communitarian considerations. Accotdingly, rights in intellectual
property cannot be constrained just because doing so will enhance overall
welfare or promote communitarian values.94 My point here is not that conLoren E. Lomsky, Rights without Stilts, 12 l-IAR\'. J. L. & P u B. POI:\' 775, 777 ( 1989). Ser also
Lyons, Utility and Rights, 24 Nm.tos 107, 111 ( 1982).
Robert Nozick, AN.\RC:HY, SnTt::.\ND UTOPL\ 30-c)1 (1974).
Ronald Dworkin, T.-\KINr; RtCHTS SERIUL SLY xi ( 1977).
~12. SeeJ ules L, Coleman & Jocly Krauss, Rl'lhi u/;i ng thr Theory oJLegal Rights, 95 Y\LE L. J. 1335,
1339 (1986).
93. Lyons, Sltjna note 89, at 112.
~q. The Second Circuit adopted this Yic11· in Iowa State L' nil'. Research Founcl. , Inc. ,._
Amcricm Broadcasting Co s., Inc., 6:21 F.2cl 57, b 1 ( 1980) ("the L1i r usc cloctri ne is not a license

89.
DaYicl
90.
91.
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straints on rights in works of authorship are n everjustifiable , but rath e r that
such co nstraints must b e rooted in con sid e rati o ns that resp ect rights. That is,
constraints of rights must be d efe nd e d in te rms of fairness. This, afte r all , is
why copyright law allows a "fair use" exce ption and n o t an "e fficient use " or a
"community b e nefit" e xcep tio n. Impli citly, co pvright law re cognizes that to
the exte nt that rights can be co nstrain e d, th e legitim ac y of d o ing so is a matte r of fa irness.
In th e following sections I d evelop a con ce pt of fair use tha t is sustainabl e
on grounds of fairness and is, thus, co mpatibl e with a rights-based view of
copyright law. Since I mainta in that th e fair use do ctrine h as always been ,
and still is, in extricably relate d to th e conc e pt of corre ctive justice, I begin
my exposition by explaining th e dem ands of corrective justice .
Th e basic ri ghts in property are typi call y p e rceive d as th e domain of distributive justice . vVe turn to di stributive justi ce to d e termine wheth e r our
holdings are fair. But whether or not th ey are fair, we re cognize the n ee d for a
distinction b e twe en legitimate and ill egitima te ways of moving resources
around . Even if the existing allocation of resources is not perfectly compatible with any scheme of distributive justice, th e law will not tolerate certain involuntary takings of property. After all, the ve r y conce pt of property implies
security against the actions of others. Property restricts the freedom of others
and limits the ways in which resources can be transferre d. To determine how
property can b e legitimately transferre d we have norms governing transfer,
taking, or use. These are the norms of transactional justice, which includes
corrective justice. These norms not only d e termin e the legitimate ways of
transferring resources but also what ought to b e done about transfers that are
illegitimate. Th erefore, these norms e nsure respect for rights in that they
protect rights against illegal transfers. So , th e concept of property rights invariably invokes the ide a of corrective justice. But to give corre ctive justice a
meaning we need an account of what makes a taking or a transfer illegitimate . That is what the principle of reciprocity of risk provides.
B. Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice

Corrective justice is concern e d with re ctification of losses that are brought
about by private wrongs. By contrast, distributive justice is concerne d with
the ge neral allotment of entitlements, resources, a nd opportunitie s. Accordingly, corrective justice gives rise to an age nt-specific duty to repair, and
distributive justice imposes agent-gen e ral duti es to re pair. 95

fo r a co r po rate th e ft, empowe ring a co urt to ig nore a co pyright wheneve r it determines th e
underlyin g work co ntains material o f possibl e public importanc e'' ).
95 . A dutv in corrective justice is age nt-sp ec ifi c becau se o nl y th e wro ng d oe r, and n o o th e r,
is obli ge d to make good th e losses o ne cau se d. A dutY in cli stributi Yejusti cc is agent-ge n e ral in
the sense that e\"l:n membe r of so cictv is rc (juircd LO co mply with the cl c mancls of the just
a lloca ti o n. Sw p,F nt mfly Co le lll a n ancl Ripstcin , .l ujna n o te 54 , at 9 1.
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Aristotle was th e first to distin guish betwee n corrective justice a nd distributive ju s tice.~H> In hi s view, however, correc tive justice is in elu ctably
re lated to distributive justice. For him the pu rpose of correc tive justice is to
restore th e proportionate distribution of entitl ements that existed b e tween
the parti es before a wrong has occu rred . Thus , the n ee d to return to the
preexistin g e ntitlem e nts imposed a duty to rectify th e loss on th e injurer.
The Aristotelian view of co rre ctive justice encounters considerabl e difficulti es in two kinds of situations. First, it does nor account for situations where
the loss of the ,·ictim differs from the gain of the injure r.97 Second, and
more importantly, in the A.ristotelian view, co rrec tive justice is d evoid of
mean in g when the prevailing distribution is incompatible with th e demands
of distributive justice. Departures from an unjust di stribution of en titlem ents n ee d not be rec tified as rec tification will only serve to res tore the
p reexisting injustice. Thus, th e Aristoteli a n view fail s to provide a n adequate moral basis for the legal duty imposed on injure rs to make good th e
losses th ey caused.
A diffe re nt view of corrective justice is assoc iated with Jules Cole man.
In Coleman's view, the purpose of correc tive justice is to sustain real
rights. Rights are real, and h ence sustainable by corrective justi ce, if they
"are worthy of protection against infringem e nt by th e actions of others,"
even if th ey are not defensible within the best scheme of distributive justice.9S The right to improve upon the existing allocation of reso urces is
reserved to the state-not to individuals. Thus, the existing allocation of
rights should only be sufficiently defensible on grounds of distributive
justice to warrant defense against individual infringeme nts.99 For Coleman , corrective justice is in a sense "tran sactional justice" as it ac ts to
protect again st violations of th e prevailing tra nsactional norms.IOO In that
capacity the role of co rrec tive justice is to ensure that resources are transfe rred in ways that are compatible with the relevant norms of the specific
co mmunity. The point of corrective justice, acco rding to Coleman, is not
to restore the preexisting allocation of reso urces but rather to ann ul the
distortions caused by wrongful or unjust transfers.IOl The importance of
Coleman's view lies in the fact that it provides a m oral basis for many
of the existing legal practices, while the Aristotelian view fails to do so.
Consequ ently, the following analysis is based o n Coleman's view of correc tive justice .

9b . .-\riswtle, TilE 01J<:HO:II.-\CHL-\\! ETHICS, book V, ~9:1- 3 0~ (v\'.D. Ross trans., 1925) .
97. As Colem an points out, only se ld om clothe losses of\·ictim ancl the gain of th e injurers
m·e rlap . .Jul es L. Cole m an , M .-\ RKETS, MOR.-\l.S .-\.'<ll TH E L\1\' 186-87 ( 1988).
98. Coleman. Risks and v\'rongs, supra note 49 , at ~1:'>2.
99. l rl.

100 . .Jul es L. Cole m an, l ntdlnlurr! flmj;aty (1/1(/ Crmtrlitw j nlliu', 78 V\. L. Rn·.
[hereinalh-r: Colem an , In te ll e ctual Propcn,·].
]()I. !d.

~8 ?, , ~87

( 1992)
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C. Th e Scop e of COITective Ju stic e a nd Copy 1·ight lnf1·in geme nts
Correc ti ve justi ce gene rates a duty to rep a ir wro ngful losses. In Co le man 's
lexi co n, losses are wro ngful when they are the res ult of wrong or wrongdoin g.lo:z ·wrongdoing occ urs wh en ever som eone impe rmissibly and unjustifiably h a rm s the leg itimate inte rests of oth e rs . 1 0 :~ vVrongs co n sist of actions
th at h a rm o r invade rights , regardl ess of whether the co nduct that cause d
th e h a rm is wrong in itse lf. 10 ·1 Thus, eve n in pri va te n ecessity cases, the
injure r has to re ctify th e losses h e or sh e impose d on the \·ictim.w:o In
Cole man's view, a person who in order to save h e r own life bre aks into
so meo ne e lse's h o u se will h ave to compe n sa te the own e r for a n y losses.
Rende ring co mp ensa tion is a way of acknowl ed ging a nd resp ecting the
righ ts of others.l 0 l1
Unde r this se t of d efiniti o ns a copyright infringement falls in th e ca tegory
of wro ngs. As Justice Story stated in Folsom, " [ t] he e ntirety of copyright is the
proper ty of the author, " 107 and, h e nce , it is no different from real pro perty. lOt\ Gen erally, eve ry un authorize d taking of priva te prope rty!09 is a violation of th e owner' s right. Unauthorized taking o f inte llectual materia ls
constitutes a copyright infringem e nt. By ava iling h e rself of a copyrighted
work, the infringer violates the prope rty right of its author an d, as is the case
with real property, a copyright infringem e nt gives the author a claim to
rep ai r in corrective justice against the infringer. This moral claim to make
repai r translates into a legal claim in torts. Rec ast in legal terms, an unauthorized use of copyrighted works is generally a tort that e n titles the
102. Co lem a n , Risks and Wrongs, suj))"a n o te 49 , at 329-3;)2. SrP alsoJules L. Co leman, Fort
Uabilit.v an d th f Limits ofCorrPclhlf juslitP, in I N H\R ~ l "S vV'\Y 139, 141 (Jul es L. Coleman & Allen
Buchanan eds., 1994) [h e reinafter: Coleman, Tort Li ab ility].
103. Coleman, Risks a nd ·w ron gs , it!. at 33 1.
104. !d. St'P also Coleman , Tort Liability, supra n ote 102, at 141.
l 05. The classic case of priYate n ecessity is Vinc e nt , .. Lake Eri e Transportation Co. , 109
Minn. 45 6, 124 N.W. 22 1 (1910). In this case th e defendant left hi s ship moored at the
plaintiff's clo ck during a two-clay sto rm. As a resul t the ship was batte red again st the cl oc k,
causing $500 in damages. The Minnesota Suprem e Co urt h eld that keeping th e ship moo red
to the plaintiff's deck was reasonable unde r the circumstances, but n eve rth e less it granted
compe nsation to the pl aintitl because th e defendant availed himself of the plaintiff prope rty.
But Si'l' Ploofv. Puntam , 8 1 Vt. 471 , 71 .-\. 188 (1908) (a dock owner whose ser vant unmoored
th e plaintiffs ship during a storm was he ld li able for the d a mage th a t was caused to the ship
and its passengers) ,.
lO ti . Colem an, Risks an d Vhon gs, supra note 49 , at ~H 0-41. SeP nlsnJ ocl Feinbe rg, Volun lrn)'
J:'utluuwsia and lhP Right to Lifi', 7 Pllll.. PL'H. AFF. 93, 102 ( 1978).
107. Folsom, sujJra, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. D. ~ilass. 184 1)(?\'o. 4,901) citin g Bramwe ll v.
Halc o mb 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.) 737 ( 1836).
108. Set. P.g., Frank H. Eastbrook, fntrlfn lu.al Projmly Is St ill Prof!nl\', 13 H \R\" . .J. L. & PLt>.
Pou· 1OS, 11 8 ( "L:ce pt in the rarest cases, we sh o uld trea t in tcll ec w al pro p e n~· a nd ph ysical
prope rty id e nti call v in th e l;m·-which is where th e brodcler cur re nts are ta king us in a sweep
nu hull protectio n ,,·ill sto p"). For a comprehen siYe discussio n of th e similarities and the
difference bet,,·ee n intangible and real propertv, .\PI' Gordon , An lnqui n·, supm note 36.
109. It is a longstand in g prin ciple of American co nstituti o nal law th~ll tak in g of pri ,·~ue
prup crtv cannot sene pri,·a tc ends. Se,, C:ald c r v. Bull '\ L:.s. ('~ Dall.) :\hS. 388 ( 17 ~18) (se ri atim
opinion); nlso Laurence H. Tribe, .-\\ tiRIC: \N Co '.'STITl 'TI 0:\.\1. L\1\ ~ CJ-:2 ~n · l:J7 -:"i8 ( 1978 ).
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mvner to legal remedics.11o This basic principle was clearly articulated by
Lord Chancellor Elden in i'vlmuan v. Tegg, who stated that ''he who has made
an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the
consequences of so doing. '' 111 Ye t, in copyright law, not e\·erv unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work constitutes an infringement. Unauthorized uses
that come under the aegis of L1ir use are specifically excused by the Copyright Act. Fair unauthorized uses are noninfringing. But 1vhat distinguishes
unauthorized fair uses from unfair ones? v'vl1y should the latter be regarded
as wrongs while the former should not? Is this distinction justified in corrective justice? I posit that these difficulties can be resolved only bv recourse to
the paradigm of reciprocity of risk that underlies the fair use doctrine.
D. The Paradigm of Reciprocity of Risk

The paradigm of the reciprocity of risk is generally associated with George
Fletcher.! I:! For Fletcher the nature of the risk that agents impose on each
other is the benchmark of liability. Central to his scheme is the distinction
between reciprocal and nonreciprocal risks. Under this paradigm, liability
in torts attaches whenever a harm results from a nonreciprocal risk taking
by the injurer where the injurer has no excuse for taking the risk. I L) A risk
is nonreciprocal when the injurer's activity creates an excessive risk of harm
relative to the risks the victim imposes on the injurer. Reciprocal risks, by
contrast, do not give rise to liability as they offset each other. The test for
reciprocity is one of both degree and kind. Nonreciprocal risks differ in
degree or kind from the risks prevailing in the relevant community. For
example, in a community of motorists, the risk of an automobile accident
is reciprocal. By contrast, in a mixed community of motorists and pedestrians, the risk of a car accident between a motorist and a pedestrian is
nonreciprocal. In the former case, no liability will attach should the risk
materialize; in the latter, the motorist will have a duty to indemnify the
pedestrians for the harm she caused them unless she has an excuse.
Accordingly, liability in copyright law should arise whenever an unauthorized user imposes a nonreciprocal risk on authors. To determine which risks
fall under this category one has to look to the relationship among members
of different communities of risk. In the context of copyright law the relevant
communities are those of authors and of users (nonauthors). The relevant
risk is the one of unauthorized taking. Put this way, it is straightforward that
as between authors and users the latter impose a nonreciprocal risk on the
former and thus should be held liable for copyright infringement for
110. On the relation between correniYc justice and tort law, .11'1' gpnnrdlv Coleman, Risks and
Wrongs, supm note elL), at 361-4::29, and Coleman, Tort Liability, sujml note 10::2. Richard A.
Epstein, PmjHTly (/Jid Nrressily, 13 H.\RY . .J. L. & Pt_T•. Pou· ::2 (1990).
111. 2 Russ (Ch.) c)85, c)90-9l (18::2b).
11::2. Fletcher. sujml note 13.
lU. !d. at :)51. Excuses arc high!\' irrele\·ant to copyright infringement cases.
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unau th o riz ed uses of copyrighted works. As betwee n auth o rs, o ne has to
turn to the p revailin g norm s a nd custom s of th e relevant community to
decid e whi ch unauth orized takings co n stitute reciprocal risks and which do
not. T hus, as betwee n au tho rs, h arms that result from reciprocal ri sks
should be d ee med fair. Th e prec ed ing analysis can be enca psu late d in a
two-princ ipl e test of fa ir use. T he first principle h o lds that on ly authors, but
not copycats, should be entitled to th e fair use privel ege . Th e second
mainta in s th at, as be tween auth ors, o nly u ses that co mport with th e pre\·ailing cu sto n1 ary practices in th e re levant com munity of a uthors sh o uld be
regarde d fai r.
Th e first prin ciple, by di stingui shin g be tween different co mmunities of
risk, identifies the pote ntial contend ers for f<:1 ir use. The second, by focusing
on custo mar y practices and so cial co 1wentio ns in the relevant comm uni ty
of risk, provides the fine-tuning. Com·e nti o nal no tio ns and local n o rms are
pivotal to th e cortce pt of corrective justice .!!-+ Having been crea ted and
sustained by behavior, m any of th ese norms and prac tices are n ot o nly fa ir
but also effi cien t.ll 5 By gen erati n g expectations-both episte mic an d normative-they form a basis for coordin a tion that b enefits th e entire co mmunity. These expec tati o ns provide a basis for individuals to pursue their pl ans
and promote their welfare. Because individuals typically benefit fro m th e
existe nce of such n o rms and practi ces, each bears a moral duty to comply
with the m and sustain th em eve n in situations where doing so vvill be to
one 's detriment.ll6
Th e two-step test proposed here h as several important virtues. First, it
provides a principled method of d ec iding fair use cases- one that en han ces
both fairness and group efficiency. Second, by sustaining and r e inforcing
preva iling expec tations, this test creates a basis for further coordin ation and
planning. Finally, this test is relatively easy to apply. It does not require
courts to p erform intricate cost-be n efit an alyses. Nor does it require courts
to d etermin e the importan ce of various u ses of intellectu al works. Courts
only need to decide whether a certain use is compatible with th e pertinent
conventions an d practices of the relevant com munity. ll7 In so doing, courts
can h ar ness th e kn owledge of the litigating parties, who are generally well
aware of the content of th e preva iling n orms and practices. To be sure,
disputes and disagreements as to th e content of such norms and the exact
boundaries set by them will sometimes arise. But based on th e evi den ce
11 4. Coleman, Risks ancl \Vrongs , sujna n o te 49. at 358.
11 5. !d. at 358- 59; Fisher, supra note 10, at 1681 n.lOO and th e sources cited therein.
11 6. Colem an, id. at 359-60 . SPnilso Rich ard A. Epstein , fn llmwlional NPws Service v. As.\ocirtiNI
Pn'ss: Cus/OIIl {/ nrl raw (/.\ Sol/ICI'S oj" Proj){')/y Rights iII NI'WS, 78 V.-'. . L. RE\'. 85, 86 ( 1992)
[here in a fter: Epstein, Custom ancl Law] ("'A ll persons who gain from th e use of th e cu stom
gen era lly may lose from its appli cation in a particular case. Th erefore , wh e n a di sp ute ari ses,
the outcome effec tively binds th e li tiga nt, who now has n·en· in ce nti\·c to d e ,·iatc from it '").
11 7. C ustom s an d com·cn ti o ns pb1· an impo rtant ro le in 1·a rious areas o f th e law. Sl'l', !'.cr. ,
U .S. C. § 1-102 (pnllidi11 g that th e <t i,·n of the Cude is ··w permit the contin ued c:-:pa nsion
comnH.:r ci<ll pract ices throug h custom. usa ge a ncl agreeme nt of th e p<trti es'") .
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adduced bv the parties, courts should be able e<1sily to resolve such disagreements.
IV. APP LIC AT ION S

This part sets out to demonstrate hem the suggested fair use test can be
squared \\·ith the text of the statu ton prmision and to illustrate its application in \arious cases im·oh·ing the fair use defense. f\Iv contention here is neither that the statutory text was tailored to fit my proposed test nor that courts
consistently apply it. I do argue , hmvever, that both the text of section 107 and
outcomes of many of the cases echo the two-step test of fair use offered here.
A . The Statutory Text

The preamble of section 107 of the Copyright Act contains a list of illustrative uses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, research,
and teaching that might be regarded as fair. All these uses share two
common features. They are all referential and , moreover, they are all
transfonnative. Central to the very essence of these uses is the principle of
drawing upon existing intellectual works in order to create new ones. liS In
other words, all those who engage in these activities impose reciprocal risks
on each other. Scholars, researchers, commentators, news reporters, teachers, and critics expose each other to risks of the same order. Building upon
existing works or at least referring to them is the point and purpose of most
of the illustrative uses. It is impossible to imagine a scholarly \vork, research,
or review that does not address preexisting works. To be sure, these activities
do not require reproduction of copyrighted materials. Necessity hardly ever
arises in the context of copyright law. After all, copyright protection subsists
in the expression and does not extend to ideas.ll9 Hence, subsequent
authors are free to use the underlying ideas of a copyrighted work as long
as they do not copy the expression.
Moreover, when there is only a limited number of ways to express an idea,
copyright protection will be withheld altogether. 1 ~0 Commentators, critics,
118. As Chafee pointed out "[t]he world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work
of our predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the
giant. .. Zechariah Chafee, Reflations 01/ the r(/w of Coj)\Tiglit, ~Ei COI.L'\1. L. RE\'. 503, 5 ll ( 1945).
119. 17 U.S. C. ~ l 02 (b) ( 1994) ( "[i ] n no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to anv idea, procedure, process, svstem , method of operation, concept,
principle or di sccl\'e rv, regardless of the form in whi ch it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such \I'Ork "). The idea/expression dichotomv is a longstanding principle in
copvright law. It was first introduced in the celebrated case of Baker\'. Selden , Hll U.S. 99
(1379). See rr/11J Goldstein. CopHight: Principles. sujnrt note 5 , ~ 2.:~ ~lt 2::23.
l:ZO. This principle is knom1 as th e '·merger doctrine": \\1wn there are onlY a fe\1' wa\'S to
dlc ctin~ h express an id ea . the id e a ancl its expression merge and no cop\-right protection
~~tt~H : hcs. Set. e.g, .. Baker\'. Selden. 101 LTS. :)l) (1 8 /l)): \lorrisn \'.Procter & Camhk C:o., g79
F.:Zcl h7:) ( Jst Cir. l ~)()7 ) .
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and sc holars are no t co mp ell e d to q uo te copyrigh te d materi als or otherwi se
re prod u ce the m in th eir works, yet th ere is a wi d espre ad custo m that all ows
doi ng that. T h e use of copyrig h te d ma terials le n ds credi b ili ty an d accuracy
to th e new wo rks. Ofte n, it is th e m ost effec tiYe wav; to create so methi ncrD
an ew. Virtua ll y all sc h olars qu ote fro m o th er sc h olarl y \\·orks; all research ers
make co pi es to carry th eir research furth er; and all criti cs make refe ren ce
to the works they critici ze . Such use s are san ctio n ed by th e p r evaili ng
conve ntion s in th e re levan t co mmunity of risk. T h e o nly use th a t mig h t
appear inc o n gruent is reproducti o n "of m u ltipl e copies for classroo m u se ."
H oweve r, Robe rt Ellickso n re po rts in thi s rega rd that '·p rofessors' substantive no rms see m to permit th e unco n tes ted co pying fo r class u se, year afte r
year, of arti cles and mino r porti o n s of books. " 1:21 Thus, insofar as th e
acad em ic community is co n cern ed , the risk of copying articles an d min or
portions of boo ks m ay b e recipro cal.
Bu t the fact that members of th e re le\·ant communities of risk impose o n
each o ther ri sks of th e sam e o rder is not en o ugh . T h e risks sh o ul d be also
of th e same m agnitude . Th at is why the illus trative uses are only presumptively fair. For exam p le, I can not copy Coase 's cl assic arti cle 'Th e P roblem
of Social Cost," add a concluding remark , and publish itjust by din t ofb ein g
an academic. Doing so would violate the p ertinen t prevailing n o rms in th e
com m unity of academics. A furth er limiti ng prin ci pl e is required . Hen ce,
the fo ur sta tuto ry factors.
Th e first factor requires courts to consider the purpose and ch aracter of
the u nauth o rized u se. In con sidering this fac tor, th e premium sh o uld b e
put o n the transformative n ature of the subsequen t work. This facto r should
be used to distinguish works that involve "intellectual labor and j udgm ent"
from mech anical re productio ns of existing works. In effect, this facto r
singles out authors and creato rs fr o m copycats. T h e commercial n ature of
the subsequent use should b e accorded very little weigh t under the p roposed test. As Justice Souter astutely observed in Campbell, " [i] f indeed
commerciali ty carried presumptive force against a findin g of fairn ess, th e
presumptio n would swallow nearly all the illustrative uses listed in th e
preamble p aragraph of§ 107 .. .. "122
Th e second facto r to be conside red is the nature of copyrighted work.
Courts typically use this facto r to gro und a distin ction betwee n works of fact
and wo rks of fictio n .l 23 But aside fro m th a t, this fac tor h as receive d scan t
attention.1 24 Under m y interpreta ti o n the n ature of the work is importan t
because it d e termin es the co nventions and custo m s to whi ch courts sh o uld
121. Sre Elli ckson , sujJm n o te 1, a t 260. Hut see Pri nce ton University Press v. i'vlichigan
Doc u me nt Se r vice In c., 99 F. 3d 138 1 (6th Ci r. 1996) (f ll bane) en/. rll'llil'd 11 7 S. Ct. 1336 (1997);
also Basic Bo oks, Inc.\'. Kin ko' s Grap hic Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D .N.Y 199 1).
122. C:mnjibPII, 5 10 U.S. at 584.
123. Sn~, r.g. , Hrupa d Row, 471 U.S. a t 564 (" [ t] h e law ge ne ra lh· recogni zes a greate r n eed to
d isseminate fa c tua l works tha n ll'or ks of fan tas\ o r fiction ") ; also Patn·, .111/Jm n o te 3, at S()cJ-7.
124 . See, e. g. , Le\al, sujJm n o te 2, a t 111 () ('Th e nature o f til e co p\Tig h ted \\'ork is a facto r
th at h as been onh· sup e rficiall Ycl iscussecl ancl li ttlc u nderstoo d ··), a nd Pat.n·. id . at 505 .
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look. Customs ~mel com ·e nti o ns Ya r y alo ng differe nt inte lle ctual good s.
Co nventio n s an d practi ces th at apply to musical wor ks may be out of ph as e
with rega rd to liter;._n~· or ~ · i sua l works. T h e secon d fac tor directs courts to
th e germane co rwe ntions of the releYant co mmunity of risk.
T he third fa c tor focus es on th e amo un t a nd substantiality of the po rtion
ta ken relatiYe to th e work in its e ntire ty. In de te rmining wh e th e r too much
h as been take n , co urts should resort to the no rm s and cu stoms of th e
re levant communi ty. If the subse qu ent u se r h as not exceeded th e permissibl e, fair use sh o uld be gra nted. Only again st th e backd rop of th e pertinent
com munity norms would courts b e able to d ec ide wheth e r th e taking was
excesstve.
Finally, th e fourth fa cto r conc ern s th e effect of th e un au thori ze d use on
th e p ote ntial ma rke t fo r th e o rigin al work. Under n1y in te rpre tation , thi s
fac tor sh o uld se rve as a safegu a rd against excessive taking. An un auth orized
u se th a t impairs th e m a rketability of the o ri gin al work is a lso likely to be in
violation of th e relevant customary practices. This is because th e norms and
con ventions that gover n activities are typically designed to en han ce th e
welfare of th e individu al communitv members.
/

B. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio Inc.

In this case th e Sup rem e Court was asked to d ec ide wheth e r th e m anufacture and sale of videotape recorders by Sony co n stitute d a con tributory
infringement1 2:'i of the r espond e n"ts' copyrights in th e ir tel evision programs .
Justice Stevens, writing for th e mcy orit:y, h eld that Sony was n ot liabl e fo r
co ntributory infringeme nt on two differe nt grounds. H e began by stating
that th e sale of copying equipment would n o t constitute a contributory
infr ingem ent if the equipme nt could also b e used for legitimate, noninfringing purposes. In this regard Justice Stevens found that video tape recorders were capable of noninfringing uses, n amely noncommercial
time-shifting by private use rs. H e added th at it was possible that oth er
television program producers stood to gain fr om the practice of tim e-shifting, and thus e nj o ining Sony from marke ting its eq uipme nt would harm
them. Justice Steve ns could h ave stopped here, but instead h e went on to
analyze whether private recording of copyrighted television programs was
excused under th e fair use d octrin e. Central to his fair use analysis was th e
assumption that h o m e u se rs record progra m s solely for purposes of timesh ifting and not in order to establish private videotape librari es. This assumption led Justice Steve n s to pronounce, afte r discussing th e first fair use
factor, that any priva te n o nc om m ercial u se is presumptively fair.

125. T he r cspo nclc n ts chose tn sun a copHi gh t infringcm e n t suit again st Son y, which mere]\'
th e equ ipme n t th a t co uld ha\'e been used in vio latio n of t.heir r ig hts, hut n o t
ag~t inst So m·'s customers, \l·ho per form e el th e ~ tctu<l i u> p\·in g. Be uusc Som itsel f dicl n o t rc prod uce th e protectccl works , th e rcspond e n ts co ul cl on I\' sue Son\' for a co n tri b u ton· in fri ngcme n r.
tn ~mufactured
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i-\fte r paying sh o rt tribu te to th e second and third facto rs, Steven s turn ed
to th e fo urth factor- the effec t of the unauth o ri ze d use o n the market fo r th e
copyri ghted work. Rne nin g to th e fact that private reco rding for purposes of
ti me-shifting was a n o n corn m e rcial use of th e wo rk , h e reasoned th a t, typ ically, n o n co mmerci al u ses wo ul d not adve rse ly impact th e marke t fo r th e
orig inal wo rk and rhus, in o rde r to prevail, th e co pyri gh t owner has to prove
"eith e r th a t th e parti cul a r u se is h a rmful o r th at if it sh o uld b eco m e " ·id espread it would adve rse ly a ffec t th e pote nti al m a rke t fo r th e copyri g h te d
wo rk. " 1 ~6 H e then co ncluded th a t in the case a t h a n d th e copyrig ht own e rs
fa iled to carr y thi s burde n with resp ect to time-shiftin g.
Justice Blackmun , writin g fo r th e dissent, stresse d th e fact that und er th e
Copyr ight Act the practice of un a uthorized h o m e videotaping con stitutes
an in frin ge ment. In rej ectin g th e fair use d efe nse h e reasoned that reco rding fo r p rivate purposes is an u n productive use th at ge nerates no b enefi ts
to th e public, and th a t it invo lves the reprodu cti on of copyrighted wo rks in
the ir e ntire ty. 1 ~7 H e th e n cauti o n ed that gran ting fa ir use in this case mig ht
e ro d e "th e very basis o f co pyrig ht law by d e privin g auth o rs of contro l ove r
the ir wo rks and con se qu e ntly of their ince ntive to c r ea t e . " I ~H
Unde r the test prop ose d h e re, the majority' s fa ir use finding in So ny was
clearly e rroneous. In this case , th e first prong of th e test that requires th e
unauthorize d users to b e creato rs themselves was n o t satisfied. Video tape
r eco rding constitutes a typi cal example of m ech anical reproduc ti o n of
copyrighted materials th a t involves neither intell ectu al labor nor creative
judgme nt. Thus, home use rs co uld not qualify as p ossibl e candidates for fa ir
u se . By imposing on th e pro duce rs the risk of un authorized ta king of
copyrighted materials, the use rs created a risk of h ar m to which th ey we re
n o t subj e ct themselves. As th e risk at bar was n o nreciprocal, th e co urt
should have held th e un auth orized use unfair a nd h ence infringing.
Alth ou gh Congress h as n o t taken any m easures to change the outco m e
of Sony, it obliquely evin ced its dissatisfaction with th e outcome of th e case
by e n ac ting the Audio H o m e Recording Act of 1992. Th e legislation o f thi s
ac t was triggered by th e e m e rgence of an ad va n ced recording m edium-digital audio ta pes-tha t allows consume rs to p e rform multiple recor-dings of musical ·works with out degenera ting th e o riginal quality of th e
so und .129 The act strikes a n inter esting balan ce be tween the interests of
co pyright owners and th ose of use rs. On the one h and it prohibits infrin gem ent suits for home audio taping. 13° On th e o th e r it levies royalty ch arges
126. Sony, 464 U .S. a t 45 1.
127. !d. a t 478- 82 (Bl ac kmun , J disse ntin g).
128. !d. a t 489 .
129 . Go lclstc in , Co p n ig h t's Hig h"·a,·, sujna n o te c)9 , a t 1:18.
130. It is impo rtant to note th at the ac t docs n ot sta te tha t ho m e a ucl iotapin g fo r p ri ,·ate p u rposes is n o t a co pvright infrin gement. Instead , it prm·icles th at ·· n o actio n mav be bro ug h t u nde r
th is title all eging infrin g em e n t of copni g ht."" 17 C.S.C. 8 100S ( 1 9~ ) 4) . According to Go ldste in
th e d istin cti o n bet\\"CC!l '·c \:Cill p ti o n aga in st infringement a ncl a p ro hibition against suin g fo r in fri ngeme n t"-~dth o u g h fin e-h as a "'po11·erful s1mboli c cff"cct lor cupnig ht owners." lr/ . :tt I () ;).
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o n sales of digital audio recorders and tapes. Once coll ec ted, the royalti es
are to b e divided among co mposers , lyricists, mu sic publishers, reco rd
produce rs, and performe rs.l 31 In effect, this legislatio n sanctions th e copyright owners' right to be ind emnified for h arms that result from private
unauthorized copying . Thus, Sony should b e co nside red an anomaly rather
th an th e rule.
C. H arp er & Row Publishers In c. v. Na tion Enterprises

In this case, The Nation magazin e got hold of a purloined manuscript of
Preside nt Ford's then unpublished autobiograp hy that was schedul ed
shortly to appear in Time magazine. Extensively quoting from this manuscript, The Nation publish ed a short piece on Ford's m emoirs that "scooped"
th e forthcoming publication in Time. This publication le d Time to cancel its
contract with the petition ers-Harper & Row-who owned the copyright in
Ford's autobiography. Harper & Row then broug ht an action for copyright
infringement against The Nation. The question before the Supreme Court
was wh ether extensive quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript come under the ambit of fair use.
Critical to the majority d enial of fair use vvas th e fact that the manuscript
was unpublished. In evaluating the statutory facto rs, Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, reiterated numerous times that the unpublish ed
nature of the work tends to negate fair use. Also significant was the fact that
The Nation's publication evidently caused an economic setback to Harper &
Row. Justice O'Connor did not, however, confine the fair use inquiry to the
four statutory factors. Custom and fairness played a key role in her finding
that The Nation's use was unfair. Her opinion conveys a clear message that
conformity with customary practices and notions of fair dealing are to
weigh h eavily in favor of a fair use finding. She even suggested that th e fair
use inquiry could be reduced to the question "would the reasonable copyright owner have consented to the [particular unauthorized] use?" l32 Along
the same line, Justice Brennan in his dissent suggested that The Nation's
conduct was in line with th e prevailing customs of the press industry.133
Th e Supreme Court's recourse to customary norms and prevailing conventions should be commendedYH Having found that The Nation's use was
arguably productive and not merely a mech anical reproduction of the
copyrighted materials, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the use
131. For a more detailecl description SPf' 17 u.s.c. s§ 1003-1007 ( 1994).
132. Hrnjm & Row, 471 U.S . at sso (c iting A. Latm a n , F.-\ I R UsE OF COI'WIGHTW vVORKS 15
( 1958)).
133. !d. at 593.
1'14. For another example of resort to industrv practices sreTriang le Publicati o n s v. KnightRidc!er Ne\\·spapcrs. 626 F.2d 1171 (:J th Cir. iC)80 ). But SPP Fisher, .1u jm1 note 10, at 1680
(arguing that il" courts ought to look be,·o nd positiH: law they will not be able to iclentifv th e
rcle,·<mt co mentiuns and standards); and Le,·al. .111j!m n o te :Z, a tll:Zli (arguing that there is no
.iustificttion fur considering moralitv <tS pan of the fair use inquiry).
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was co mpatible with th e cu sto mar y practices and co nYe ntion s of th e n e,,·s
publishing industr y. Both th e petitioner-Harpe r & Rcm·-and th e res pond e m-T/ze Nation-were publishers and thus b elonged to the sam e co mmuniL)' of risk. Moreover, th ey were both y;·in g for the right to publish first a
n ews item-the memoirs of Presid e nt Forcl. Therefo re , the Court h ad to
d ec id e whe ther The Nation's appropria ti on o f th e co pnighted mater ials
,·io lated the cu stom a r y practices gmer nin g n ews publishing.
A rece nt article b y Richard Eps te in ma,· le nd so m e suppo rt to the majorin··s finding that The Nation's use was excess iYe re lati,·e to the ]Xe\·ai lin g
custo ms. Eps tein conte nds that in the 1920s th e re appeared a c ustomary
prac ti ce in the news industry that prohibited misappropriation of n ews
ite ms from rivals. 10"' Th e status of this practice at present is uncl ear, h owe,·e r. l'vly aim here is not to d efe nd the m <uority op inio n in HwjJer & Row,
but rat h e r to champion the reco urse to customs and co mmunity conventions as a varclstick for fairness.
j

D . With a View to th e Future: Electronic Mail Correspon dence

Paul Go ldstein colorfully dubbed copyright law "the child of technolog-y. "l:lli
Indee d, no other legal discipline has b een affected by techn o logical
changes as much as th e law of copyright. Throughout the history of copyright law, introduction of n ew technologies h as created both opportunities
for auth ors and copi ers and shaped th e conto urs of copyright protec tion.
At prese nt we are in the middle of an unpreced ented information revolution wro ught by computerization and innovative communication technologies. These new techn o logies pose challe n ges for the law of copyright in
general and the fair use doctrine in particular.
One such challenge is presented by electronic mail. Assuming th at for
purposes of copyright protection E-mail messages are no different fi·om
regular le tters ,l37 th en "additio n " or "interspersin g" re ply messages are in
violation of the original a uth or's copyrightY>S H owever, under m y proposed
test such uses would invariably be fair. Everyone who uses E-mail for corre135 . Epstein, Custom ancl L aw, su jmt n ote 116, at ~l7.
136. Go ldstein, Copyrigh t in the New Information Age, supra note 61, at 1.
U 7. To qualify for copyright pro tection an expression must b e fi xe d in a tangible m edium
o f exp ressio n. According to§ 101 of the Cop\Tight "\ ct, this re quirement is satisfi ed when th e
e mbod im ent of the expression is sufficie ntlY permanent to permit the express ion to be
p e rceived, reproduced, or oth e n,·ise comm uni cated for a pe riod of more than transitorY
duratio n . 'Whil e it is cl ear th at savin g a wo rk in th e m e m orv of a co mputer is fi xation for
purposes of co pyrig ht protectio n , Stern Elec. In c. 1'. Kaufman , 669 F. 2cl 852 , 85:'"J (2d c ir. 1982) ,
it is sti ll uncertain whether bri e f fixation in a comp ute r's ra ndom access m em orv (RA!'d )
sa ti sfies the statutory requireme nt.
13S . Stt. t'.g., \bureen O ' Rourke, f'mjHirty Rights nl fh p,-itrd J)ato, 41 FEn. B_\R. 0i t 11·s &J. :'"J!!,
:J l -1 ( l ~ll)4) . :'vlorc spc cificall\', such uses 111a1 1·ioLltc the a tt lhor"s exc lusi1·e ri ght to prepare
ckr i1·a tin· 1mrks based on the original cop11igh tee! 11-ork. Il e n e Kn~tblc Cons & "\i an U.
Rtttcnbng. Xr/lligoti11g tl1 1' (;/olitillnjimnoti on Sujmhi,!l,lnflll_\'.- . \ lJu!llj!Y liollll Un Al11'111f. S f-1.\R\ ' . .J.
l.. & Tt :c11. '2.7:). :'118 ( I ~l%).
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spo ncl e n ce is essentially an a uth o r. El ec tro ni c m a il is simply a m edium
throug h which users exchange messages th at may qualify for copyri g h t
protec tion. Thus, in sofar as E-mail messages are co n ce rn e d th e re is n o
distinction benveen authors an d nonauthors. Eve r y u se r is also an a uth or.
,:-\ccord in g ly, the risk of copyin g is reciproc al by nature in the community of
E-m ail users. :r..~lor eover, th e practice of reprodu cin g th e or igin al m essage in
the re pl·y is commonplace in E-m ail correspondence. Con se que ntl y, with
regard to e lec troni c m a il correspo ndence , copyin g of whole m essages is a
re ciprocal risk , and h a rm s that mav stem frOill it sh ould not give rise to
copyright liabilitv.
V. CONCLUSION

Mv a im in this articl e h as b een to demonstrate that th e fair use doc trin e
should be understood and inte rpre ted within the framework of correc tive
justice. In doing so, I h ave sh own that all attempts to explicate th e d octri n e
on other grounds have failed. The thrust of this articl e is that the paradigm
of reciprocity of risk should guide courts and users of intellectual works in
deciding what uses are fair. Specifically, I have proffered a tlvo-prong test for
d ete rmining what uses are fair. The first prong provides that in th e sph ere
of un authorized uses only the ones that are productive or transform a tive
can possibly qualify as fair. The second holds that, of the group of pro ductive uses, only the subset that does not violate th e cu stomary practices and
con ve ntions of the rel evan t community of creators be awarded fair u se .
Un d e rstoo d properly, the fair use doctrine is a relatively coh e re nt doctrine that aims to do justice between authors and unauthorized users of
th ei r works. Striking the balance benveen authors and subsequent users
according to the proposed test will lead to an outcome that is both fair and
efficie nt. Furthermore, by creating conformity between the law and the
expecta tions of the party, the proposed test will e n able authors and users to
plan and pursue their creative e ndeavors , the re by e nriching the culture an d
knowledge of us all.
I

